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NOTES
VOTING RIGHTS OF PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS UNDER THE
PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935*
THE Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,1 compounded to
rectify a long series of corporate abuses, 2 censures the use of preferred stock
in general, and non-voting preferred stock in particular, as a method of
utility financing.3 The ideal corporation envisaged by Section 7(c) (1) has
one class of stock sharing equally in dividends and voting rights. That sec-
tion, however, applies only to issues of new securities and is hedged with
such multitudinous exceptions 4 that it dpes little more than raise a pre-
sumption.5 To protect the many preferred issues permitted, sections were
added to the Act insuring voting rights to preferred stockholders. For
example, a declaration to alter rights of outstanding securities is denied
effectiveness under Section 7(c) if it "will result in an unfair or inequitable
distribution of voting power." But the Commission's leniency in applying
this section 7 left it to Section 11(b) (2) to assure real voting rights to pre-
ferred stock.8 In response to the broad mandate to prevent anything which
would "unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among securities," 9
* New York State Electric & Gas Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2807,
June 9, 1941.
1. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1939).
2. See, e.g., SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcTivI-
TIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES
(1938) Pt. VII pp. 109-97, 397-400, 480-81. See also Commissioner (later Chairman
and now Judge) Frank's memorable dissent in The North American Co., 4 S. E. C. 434,
462-516 (1939).
3. "Control . . . exerted through disproportionately small investment" was cited
to show the necessity for control of holding companies. § 1 (b) (3).
4. See §§ 6(b) and 7(c) (2).
5. The requirement of voting common stock issues in § 7(c) (1) raises a presumption
in favor of voting coipmon stock in all cases. Community Power and Light Co., 6 S. E. C.
182, 194, n. 4 (1939) ; cf. National Gas and Elect. Corp., 2 S. E. C. 632, 639 (1937).
6. Section 7(d) (6) might also be applied since it relates to the terms and conditions
of issue and sale.
7. Despite extremely inequitable distribution of voting power in many cases, the
Commission avoided a decision under §7(e) and reserved jurisdiction for subsequent
action pursuant to § 11(b) (2). Columbia Gas & Elect. Corp., 4 S. E. C. 406 (1939);
New York and Richmond Gas Co., 4 S. E. C. 535 (1939); Philadelphia Co., 6 S. E. C.
'752 (1940); Securities Corp. General, Holding Company Act Release No. 2301, Sept.
23, 1940. See Comment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1228, 1229 for the opinion that § 7(e) may
not apply where an existing inequitable distribution of voting power is exaggerated.
8. The first proceedings under § 11(b) (2) were instituted on May 9, 1940. Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 2051.
9. Section 11(a) imposes on the Commission the duty to examine the corporate
structure of every registered holding company and subsidiary company thereof to discover
how voting power may be fairly and equitably distributed. § 11(b) (2) then directs the
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the Commission slowly filled in the vague outline of "fair and equitable"
and enfranchised preferred stockholders. 10
The ultimate enfranchisement was reached in Columbia Gas and Electric
Corporation" and Northern Neoe, E gland Conzpany,12 where the corpor-
ations involved were virtually handed over to the old preferred stockholders.
In the former, the applicant sought a finding pursuant to Section 11(e)
that its plan of reorganization satisfied the requirements of Section 11 (b) (2).
The preferred investment was almost equal to the common equity and, since
most of the latter was represented by a special capital surplus to be used
for further possible write-downs, might become many times greater. 3 Never-
theless, the preferred stock was to be given one vote per share only upon
the happening of four quarterly defaults, without a greater vote in the event
of continued defaults. The Commission found such a slim voting power in
relation to the investment of the preferred stock an unfair and inequitable
distribution of voting power which caused the plan to fall short of the require-
ments of Section 11(b) (2).14 The Commission, however, went beyond the
needs of the case to say:' 5
"'To satisfy the requirements of Section 11(b) (2) it is not suffi-
cient to give preferred stockholders a vote. The vote, to be effective,
must be such as will afford them recognition in the corporation in
Commission to order companies to "take such steps as the Commission shall find neces-
sary to ensure that the corporate structure or continued existence of any company in the
holding company system does not . . . unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power
among security holders." The clause relating to distribution of voting power, unlike other
provisions of § 11(b) (2), relates to both holding companies and operating companies.
10. See, in general, Meck and Cary, Re.ulalon of Corporate Finance and 3Manage-
ment under the Public Utility Holdinq Company Act of 1935 (1938) 52 H,%rm. L Rxv.
216, 224-226; Comment (1941) 50 Y.aLE L. J. 1228. After the dissent in North American
Co., 4 S. E. C. 434, 462, preferred stocks were given the right to vote as a class in cases
where they were affected, such as issues of prior or parity preferred, issues of unsecured
debt securities, merger, and alteration of rights and preferences. E.g., Southwestern Gas
and Elect. Co., 6 S. E. C. 806 (1940) ; Central Ohio Light and Power Co., 5 S. E. C.
651 (1939); Wisconsin Gas and Elect. Co., 5 S. E. C. 418 (1939); West Penn Power
Co., 5 S. E. C. 376 (1939); San Antonio Public Service Co., 5 S. E. C. 336 (1939);
New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 5 S. E. C. 214 (1939). SEC RzUrO , supra note
2, Appendix B, is replete with cases sho%%ing the need for such rights to vote and to vote
as a class.
11. Holding Company Act Release No. 2477, Jan. 10, 1941. See note 7 supra for an
earlier decision involving the company, in which the question of inequitable distribution
of voting power was avoided. The present case was not so important for what it did
as for what it said. See The North American Co., 4 S. E. C. 434 (1939) (elect one-quar-
ter of the board before default) ; San Antonio Public Service Co., 5 S. &- C. 336 (1939)
(one vote per share before default) ; Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. F_. C. 483 (1939)
(elect two directors before default).
12. Holding Company Act Release No. 2737, May 3, 1941.
13. The preferred investment was $120,897,SSO, including $9,680,780 of surplus repre-
senting the liquidation premium on the preferred stock. The common capital plus surplus
was $133,394,230, of which $116,093,939 represented the special capital surplus.
14. The company unsuccessfully sought to escape the holding by pointing to its good
dividend record. Brief for applicant, p. 64.
15. Holding Company Act Release No. 2477, Jan. 10, 1941, 24.
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an amount substantially corresponding to the proportion of their
investment in the corporation."
The Commission thus announced its intention to grant preferred stock the
voting rights of common stock, 1 even before default- in preferred dividends.
The application of this rule in succeeding Section 11(b) (2) proceedings
would have given preferred stockholders voting control in many companies
and would, as a result, undoubtedly have discouraged future issues of pre-
ferred stock.1
7
The Commission acted even more drastically in Northern New England
Company, requiring that the preferred and common stocks be reclassified in
a single class of stock.' 8 At least a redistribution of voting power was
clearly called for; the common, representing 24% of the total capital stock
liability and surplus on the books but apparently without asset value, had
74% of the total voting power.19 In addition, there were three different
classes of preferred stock with substantial arrears. This complexity of the
corporate structure was cited as the reason for the Commission's decision
to go farther than redistribute voting power, but probably of equal importance
were the instability and fluctuations of earnings and the thin equities in
subsidiaries. 20 There were thus two factors which were not present in the
Columbia Gas case-complexity of the corporate structure and unsatisfactory
financial condition.2 1 Since the former falls within the express mandate of
16. The Commission later recognized that there should be weighting for differences
in risk'position. Electric Bond and Share Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2962,
Aug. 23, 1941.
17. The rule would also have raised the problem of protecting common stockholders.
See DEwiXG, CORPORATION SECURITIES (1934) 194, 11. vv, for an example of how pre-
ferred stockholders tried to abuse the voting rights given them. Gay, Managerial Suicide:
A Suggested Alternative to the Death Sentence (1940) 25 P. U. FORT. 707, suggests di-
vestment of control by enfranchisement of preferred stockholders, and even bondholders,
as an alternative to reorganization into regionally integrated properties.
18. In a § 11(b) (2) proceeding the Public Utilities Division moved for an order to
liquidate or reclassify the stock into one class. The Commission's decision may have been
made easier by the company's yielding between the times of hearings and opinion. Recap-
italization was similarly ordered in Associated Gas and Elect. Co., Holding Company
Act Release No. 2933, August 13, 1941. See also Electric Bond and Share Company,
Holding Company Act Release No. 2962, August 23, 1941.
19. The distribution of new securities was not decided upon at the time, It can be
expected, however, that the common stock will receive a nominal share but no more. See
Community Power and Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 182 (1939), and Federal Water Service
Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2635, March 24, 1941.
20. "But in view of the facts in the record before us-particularly the instability and
fluctuations of NEPSCO's earnings, the thin equities in subsidiaries which constitute
NEPSCO's principal assets, and the absence of any facts to justify the issuance of new
preferred stock-we have concluded that the recapitalized company could not, consistently
with the standards of Section 11 (b) (2), support an issue of preferred stock." Holding
Company Act Release No. 2737, May 3, 1941, 8.
21. The preferred investment here, moreover, was more disproportionate to the com-
mon than in Columbia Gas and Electric. If a large part of the special capital surplus in
the latter case were used to cover asset write-downs, the stock would probably be reclassi-
fied as in the present case.
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Section 11(b) (2), it must be considered the more important, but the deci-
sion suggested that financial weakness might in itself dictate the conversion
of the preferred stock.
-2 2
By these two cases voting rights of preferred stock hecame defined by
what appeared to be settled principles. If the corporate structure were
complex, the company in financial straits, or the preferred investment grossly
disproportionate, the preferred stockholders would receive common stock
in the recapitalized corporation.2 3 If, on the other hand, the financial con-
dition of the company and its corporate structure were satisfactory, and the
preferred investment not disproportionate, the preferred stockholders would
be given voting rights in proportion to their investment even before default.
In addition, they would receive a majority of the voting power after a
number of defaults in preferred dividends.
2 4
In a recent case, however, the Commission has shown that the rule of the
Columbia Gas case cannot be interpreted to compel enfranchisement of the
preferred before default. In the case of Neu 1orl State Elecric & Gas
Corporation,25 the company sought to issue 120,OCO shares of new preferred
stock and retire 60,000 shares of old preferred with part of the proceeds.
The sole voting right accorded to the new preferred was to elect a majority
of the board after six quarterly defaults in preferred dividends. When the
60,000 shares had been issued almost two Years before, the preferred stock-
holders, pursuant to the old rule, were given the right to elect one-quarter
of the board of directors permanently - i.e.. before default - and a majority
after twelve quarterly defaults.20 The original application for the new issue
of preferred stock contained these same voting rights hut, at the suggestion
of the Commission's staff2  an amended application was filed comitting the
vote before default and moving up from twelve to six quarterly defaults the
time when the preferred would receive voting control.28-  While the Com-
mission's opinion did not mention voting rights before default, it was apparent
that the extreme implications of the Columbia Gas rule had been rejected
and that non-voting preferred stock is still a legitimate instrument of utility
finance.
22. In addition to the voting power clause,§ 11(b)(2) directs the Commission to
prevent undue or unnecessary complication of the corporate structure. Since complexity is
a relative state, however, a structure which might be complex for a company in poor
financial condition would be satisfactory for a company in better financial condition.
23. Any one of the three may be sufficient. A complex corporate structure is spe-
cifically condemned by § 11 (b) (2) ; poor financial condition makes it impossible for the
corporation to support a preferred issue; and it is not feasible to have a preferred stock
with a much greater investment and voting power than the common stock.
24. The preferred stock, moreover, would have the right to vote as a class on
special matters affecting their rights. See note 10 supra.
25. Holding Company Act Release No. 2807, June 9, 1941.
26. 5 S. E. C. 214 (1939). The preferred stock represented about 20% of the total
capital stock liability.
27. Communication to Yum LAW JoURNAL from the Director of the Public Utilities
Division, Oct. 10, 1941.
28. SEC, File No. 70-320.
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Behind the Commission's apparent change of front may be its own lack
of conviction that permanent voting rights are in themselves a desirable or
useful protection for preferred stock.20  Practice, as exemplified by the
present case, showed that voting rights are an inadequate solution. The two
directors on the five man board who were supposedly representing the pre-
ferred stockholders had long been connected with the company and had been
directors elected by the common stock (the parent) for at least two years
previously.30 As long as the management was in control of the proxy machin-
ery a different result could not be expected. 31 The Commission's disregard of
permanent voting rights in the instant case, coupled with its insistence on
earlier special enfranchisement after default, suggests that strengthening of
contingent voting rights will be its future objective in the protection of
preferred stockholders. This objective appears more just and realistic than
initial enfranchisement.3 2 If an investor is interested more in a stable return
than in taking part in the management, the grant of permanent yoting rights
may give little beyond an illusion of security. 33 As soon as his stable return
is threatened, however, the preferred stockholder becomes vitally interested
in the company's operations. At this point contingent voting rights appear
as an extraordinary security device whose virtue depends on its timeliness.
In the principal case, for instance, the enfranchisement of the stockholders
of the retired issue enabled them to elect one quarter of the board from the
beginning, but their right to elect a majority would not appear until after
three years of default, by which time the corporation might be beyond salvage
29. Chairman (now Justice) Douglas had advocated voting rights for all stockhold-
ers. See Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1330. He
recognized, however, that much more was required (at 1332-1334) and said: "No pro-
gram can be effective unless the scattered, disorganized, lethargic, and impotent stockhold-
ers have some one to think and act for them," (at 1334).
30. Compare the annual reports for 1937-1940. Rutledge, Significant Trends in Mod-
er Incorporation Statutes (1937) 22 WAsH. U. L. Q. 305, 341-342, suggests that special
boards be elected for each class of securities to serve as eyes and ears of the investors
but not to take part in the management of the company. Unless, however, other steps
were taken, the same result as in New York State Electric & Gas might be expected,
31. The rules adopted pursuant to § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are made applicable to companies subject to the Holding Company Act. Rule U-61. Those
rules, however, are ineffective to prevent management control of nominations for directors.
See Comment (1939) 28 GEO. L. J. 232, 251-52.
32. For the position that strong contingent voting rights afford greater protection
than permanent voting rights, see Stevens, Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centrali-
sation of Voting Control (1926) 40 Q. J. EcoN. 353, 386-92; Stevens, Voting Rights of
Capital Stock and Shareholders (1938) 11 J. Bus. OF U. or Cm. 311, 342-48. See also
Legis. (1939) 27 GEO. L: J. 1092, 1103-08, to the effect that equal voting rights for all
stockholders accomplish nothing.
33. "Voice in management is of lesser interest to preferred stockholders; they look to
the safeguards in their contract for protection." BERLE, SrUDIES IN TuE LAw oF Colt-
PORATIoN FINANCE (1928) 45; Berle, Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers' Control" (1926)
39 HRV. L. REv. 673, 677. On the other hand, GRAHAM AND DOD, SEcuiu'y ANALySIS
(1934) 221, advocates a permanent right for preferred stockholders to elect some direc-
tors. It has even been suggested that bondholders be given voting rights when their
stake in the business is large. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) 102-03.
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by the most prudent directors.34 The new issue, on the other hand, enables
the preferred to take control eighteen months after the first default. While
any choice of a period, balancing protection for the preferred with the need
for managerial flexibility, must avoid forcing the management into impro-
vident dividend declarations to preserve its control of the company, the
acceleration of the contingent rights in the principal case seems well justified.
With the shifting of emphasis from original to contingent enfranchisement,
contingencies other than default may well be explored. For while the most
immediate need for voting rights arises when the company is unable to make
preferred dividend payments, by that time the harm may be done. For
example, a contingent voting right may be appropriate when 'the common
cushion falls below a certain ratio to the preferred investment. A more
complex, but an economically useful standard, might be the ratio of earn-
ings to fixed charges and preferred dividend requirements, with increasing
contingent voting rights as the ratio continues to fall. Contingent voting
rights might also be given in cases where the debt ratio is too high.3a The
average figures for the industry could be used as the standard in all three
of these cases. 36 The grant of voting rights upon the happening of such con-
tingencies would allow the preferred stockholders to step in before it is too
late to protect their interests. 37 In companies where the preferred investment
is insubstantial, the preferred stockholders might receive a vote upon the
happening of the above contingencies before actual default, but not voting
control.3 s
Since the value of contingent voting rights depends on the intelligence and
independence of their exercise, effective protection of preferred stockholders
may require additional safeguards. A requirement that a form prepared by
34. The preferred stockholders might receive control just in time to see their inter-
est completely wiped out in a reorganization by the absolute priority rule. See Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939).
35. For other suggested contingencies, see Stevens, [*otinq Rights of Capital Stoch
and Sharcholders (1938) 11 J. Bus. OF U. OF Cri. 311, 347 (when surplus, liquid assets,
current ratio, or cash fall below specified ratios) ; Gn.\u.Ar AND Dorn. SEcutrTy AN,%,-
Ysis (1934) 221 (when sinking fund payments are missed or working capital is not main-
tained) ; Comment (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1341 (when earnings or surplus fall,
sinking fund payments or asset positions are not maintained, or the current ratio falls).
36. In 1940, the average common cushion of 218 operating electric and gas utilities
in 39 registered public utility holding company systems was 32.39% against preferred
stock's 17.76% of total capitalization and surplus; debt represented 49.35% of total capital-
ization and surplus; and fixed charges plus preferred dividend requirements were covered
1.72 times. Holding Company Act Release No. 230, June 20, 1941.
37. Whenever the contingent voting right is to elect a bare majority of the board,
some measure must be taken to protect preferred stockholders in the event that the com-
mon stockholders should also own some of the preferred stock. A drastic, but probably
necessary, step to avoid this conflict in interests would be to disqualify preferred stock-
holders from voting to the extent of their common stock holdings.
38. For a discussion of the mechanics of granting contingent voting rights and pro-
viding for return of control to the common stockholders when the default is cured, see
Tracy, The Problem of Granting Voting Rights to Bondholders (1935) 2 U. or CU. L.
REv. 208, 214-216.
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the Commission be sent to preferred stockholders whenever contingent voting
rights mature might be helpful. If the proxy machinery is controlled by the
management, the preferred stock representation in many cases will be in-
effectual. 39 One possibility would be to require Commission approval of
designees as preferred stock directors pursuant to rules defining conflicting
interests. A more far-reaching alternative would be an act similar to the
Trust Indenture Act 40 establishing trustees for preferred stock issues who
would send out proxies when the contingencies giving voting rights arise.41
The former, being simpler and capable of immediate adoption by the Com-
mission, would probably be sufficient. It would, however, have the present
weakness of leaving to the management the declaration of the happening
of contingencies giving rise to voting rights. If the declaration were not
made, the duty would devolve upon the Commission to discover the need
for a declaration from the annual report and order it. The trustee device,
on the other hand, would have the additional advantage of supplying the
preferred stockholders with an experienced watch-dog to be constantly on
guard over their interests. Without these or similar protective devices, even
the vigilance and realism displayed by the Commission in the principal case
may not prevent the sacrifice of the substance to the shadow in the search
for adequate representation for the preferred stockholder.
42
LEGALITY OF SYMPATHETIC STRIKE TO PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT*
AN awareness of the non-legal nature of many disputes between employer
and employee has consistently led the New York Court of Appeals to refuse
to restrain labor activity which is directed toward the improvement of the
39. See note 31 supra; Comments (1940) 53 HARV. L. Rsv. 1165; (1939) 33 ILL.
L. REV. 914.
40. 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 aaa (Supp. 1941). If the Act were suc-
cessful, it might be extended to all corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission.
41. To meet this problem and that of stockholders' indifference and inability, various
other proposals have been made. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORi'ORATION F1-
NANCE (1928) 39, suggests that trust companies accept, on "custodian account," deposits
of stock and work as permanent protective committees. Douglas, supra note 29, at 1332-
34, suggests a permanent quisi-public organization to represent stockholders for a fee
on a service rather than profits basis. See also SEC REPORT, supra note 2, p. 413.
42. The Holding Company Act is "a conservative experiment . . . to conserve pre-
cious American traditions. If it works, it may become a pattern of governmental action in
other fields of investment . . . If that experiment fails, then investors may well despair of
protection." Frank's dissent in North American Co., 4 S. E. C. 434, at 468 (1939). The
problems discussed here apply to all preferred stock issues. It is thus all the more im-
portant that the solution be found in public utilities for possible extension to all companies.
* Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), cert.
denied, 10 U. S. L. WEEK 3123 (1941).
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terms or conditions of employment.' This policy was fortified by the New
York Anti-Injunction Act,2 which was intended to compel a similar restraint
upon lower courts.3 A series of recent cases, however, has narrowed the
"allowable area of economic conflict" 4 and severely curtailed the application
of the statute.5
One of the most important of these recent cases, Opera On Tour, Incor-
porated v. Weber.G presents an unusual version of the sympathetic strike,
but one which is likely to become increasingly common. An itinerant opera
company made a business of rendering performances of grand opera in
various cities. The demands of economy forced the company to produce
the orchestral accompaniment from electrically transcribed recordings, thus
dispensing with the need for musicians. Claiming that the use of mechanical
music was detrimental to the welfare of musicians throughout the country,
the Musicians' Union7 persuaded the Stagehands' Union s to have its mem-
bers withdraw from the company's employment and refuse to return until
such time as the company agreed to hire an orchestra. Unable to continue
without the stagehands, the company sought to obtain their return by means
of an injunction against the two unions. This was granted by the Supreme
Court,9 which, although overruled by the Appellate Division,10 was upheld
1. See, for e-ample, May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331,
26 N. E. (2d) 279 (1940), rch'g denied, 282 N. Y. 804, 27 N. E. (2d) 210 (1940);
F. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); Stillwell Theatre,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932), cert. dcnicd, 288 U. S. 605} (19321;
Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant,
Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y.
342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917); National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315,
63 N. E. 369 (1902).
2. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 876(a), N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477.
3. See Comment (1940) 49 YA.LE L. J. 537, 538.
4. The phrase apparently originated in Stillwell Theatres, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259
N. Y. 405, 412, 182 N. E. 63, 66 (1932). cert. denied. 28S U. S. 60b (19321.
5. See, in addition to the principal case, American Guild of Musical Artists v.
Petrillo, 286 N. Y. 226, 36 N. E. (2d) 123 (1941); Busch Jewelry Co., Inc. v. United
Retail Employees' Union Local 830, 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939);
Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (4th
Dep't 1936), aff'd without opinion, 279 N. Y. 635, 18 N. E. (2d) 37 (1938); Thompson
v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937). See also (1939) S Ir.. Junip.
Ass'x Buu.t 29.
6. 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), cert. denicd, 10 U. S. L W\'rm,-. 3123
(1941).
7. The American Federation of Musicians, a union which includes musicians who
play in theatres and in both popular and serious orchestras. Defendant Weber was sued
in his capacity as president.
S. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture Ma-
chine Operators of the United States and Canada.
9. Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 170 Misc. 272, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 83 (Sup. Ct.
1939).
10. Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 258 App. Div. 516, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 144
(1st Dep't 1940). The majority held this lawful as a concerted effort to secure
employment, saying that "questions concerning wages, hours, and improved x;orking
conditions could never arise unless there was opportunity for employment" The dissent
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by the Court of Appeals. Resorting chiefly to the dubious authority of Massa-
chusetts and federal cases," Judge Finch said that it was not a lawful
objective for a union to insist that machinery be discarded in order to secure
further opportunities of employment for workers of another trade. Further-
more, he said, there was no "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Anti-
Injunction Act and, therefore, no reason why an injunction should not be
issued.
The principal case is but one of several recent New York cases which
indicate that if the object of the labor activity is held unlawful, the Anti-
Injunction Act will not apply. 12 The most clear-cut expression of this thesis
is to be found in American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo,l a where the
American Federation of Musicians was enjoined from continuing its efforts
to compel certain artists to join their organization on penalty of being barred
from appearing with symphony orchestras, opera companies, and other con-
cerns upon which the union felt able to exert pressure. The object was not
lawful, said the court, because it bore no "reasonable connection with wages,
hours, health, safety, the right of collective bargaining, or some other con-
dition of employment."' 14 And since it was not lawful, there was no "labor
dispute," thus making inapplicable the Anti-Injunction Act. 15
stressed the danger to technological progress and the fact that a denial of the injunc-
tion would keep satisfied employees out of work and deprive smaller cities of grand
opera.
11. Chief Judge Lehman, who wrote a vigorous dissent, particularly criticized
Judge Finch's reliance on Haverhill Strand Theatre, Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413,
118 N. E. 671 (1918). ". . . an analysis of the opinion shows that the decision is
based upon doctrines accepted in Massachusetts but repudiated here and in other
jurisdictions. The Massachusetts court made entirely clear the question it there deter-
mined, stating: 'The question propounded to the court by the agreement of parties
is this: Is a combination between musicians a legal one by which a plaintiff is com-
pelled to employ a number of musicians specified by the members of the combination
if he wishes to employ any member of the combination, even though it be the fact
that in plaintiff's opinion the employment of a single musician is the most advantageous
way of conducting his (the plaintiff's) business and that employment of more than
one musician will cause him pecuniary loss?' To that question the Massachusetts
court answered 'No.' To the same question, this court in J. H. & S. Theatres, Inc. v.
Fay (260 N. Y. 315) unhesitatingly and unanimously answered 'Yes."' Opera On
Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 372, 373, 34 N. E. (2d) 349, 360 (1941), cert. denied, 10
U. S. L. WEEK 3123 (1941).
12. See, for example, Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674
(1937). For a good example of this tendency in the lower courts, see Gips v. Oswan,
170 Misc. 53, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 828 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
13. 286 N. Y. 226, 36 N. E. (2d) 123 (1941). Chief Judge Lehman again dis-
sented.
14. American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N. Y. 226, 231, 36 N. E.
(2d) 123, 125 (1941).
15. "Labor dispute," as defined by the statute, is extremely complex. N. Y. Civ.
PRAc. Acr §876(a)10. The definition is recognized as the vulnerable part of the
anti-injunction statutes. See United Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935), 21 CORN. L. Q. 640; Comments (1938) 23 CORN. L. Q. 473; (1937) 50 I-IARv.
L. REv. 1295; (1937) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 116. See also Comment (1937) 35 Miin.
L. IEv. 1320; (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1064.
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The result of this doctrine - that there is no "labor dispute" unless the
object is deemed lawful- is to deprive the statute of its effectiveness. If
the statute had never been passed, no court would enjoin labor activity which
was directed toward a legitimate object, provided that the means used
were also lawful.16 By interpreting it to forbid the issuance of injunctions
only in cases where both object and means are found to be lawful, the Court
of Appeals has made entirely futile the enactment of the statute. New York
courts are now free to issue injunctions in accord with their own beliefs
concerning legitimate objectives of labor.17 In view of this severe limita-
tion upon the statute, it is more than ever important to hold a wide variety
of purposes to be proper objectives of labor activity.
Labor's right to resist the impact of technological advance by concerted
action has been upheld by several jurisdictions.1 8 There is no New York
decision on the issue of a union's right to order a strike which has the
purpose of compelling an employer to discard his machinery and thereby
make work for men.19 But in Baillis v. Fuchs2 0 picketing of an employer
and his customers by a union which had called a strike against the employer
was allowed, even though the employer was operating the business himself
at the time and claimed an intention not to hire any new employees. And
in Welinsky v. Hillnan,2'- a New York Supreme Court case, a strike was
permitted to compel the continuance of a manufacturing department which
the employer sought to abandon.2 2 It is, however, the traditional New York
16. See FRANKFURTER AND GRENEa, THE LAEOR INJUNcrION (1930) 30-46. The
Court of Appeals has consistently modified injunctions against labor activity, limiting
their application to acts of violence or deceit. See, for e.,-ample, Baillis v. Fuchs,
283 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d) 812 (1940); May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v.
Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d) 279 (1940), reh'g denied, 282 N. Y. 804, 27 N. E.
(2d) 210 (1940).
17. Lower courts have generally interpreted "lawful object" more narrowly than
the Court of Appeals. See Comment (1940) 49 YALE L J. 537, 538 and cases there
cited.
18. United States v. Carrozo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N. D. Ill. 1941) ; Bayer v. Brother-
hood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 108 N. J. Eq. 257; 154 Ad. 759 (1931).
But see Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897).
19. But in Dubrow Pure Food v. Glazel, 239 App. Div. 844, 264 N. Y. Supp.
533 (2d Dep't 1933), aff'd, 263 N. Y. 589, 189 N. E. 712 (1933), it was held unlawful for
unions to picket an employer who had discontinued his restaurant in favor of a
cafeteria, thus dispensing with the service of waiters.
20. 283 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d) 812 (1940).
21. 185 N. Y. Supp. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
22. It can be argued that a strike to compel the replacement of machines with
men is not for a "proper object" because it does not involve a "condition of employ-
ment." This, however, is a very narrow position. See May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear,
Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d) 279 (1940), rch'g denied, 2812 X. Y. 804, 27
N. E. (2d) 210 (1940).
In answer to the argument that the object is not lawful because it seeks to hold
back technological progress, see Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws (1940)
34 ILL. L. REv. 769, 784: "Yet a demand for the hiring of so-called useless and un-
necessary labor may be but an inartistic and clumsy way of expressing a desire for
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policy of non-intervention in disputes properly a part of the economic struggle
between labor and management which constitutes the most persuasive argu-
ment that a union may call a strike designed to replace machines with men.
2
1
This seems to have been recognized by the court in Opera On Tour,
Incorporated v. Weber. Judge Finch admits that "individually and collec-
tively, the members of any union may at any time refuse to work, because
machinery is employed or for any other reason, and may strike in so
doing." 24  What seems to have been enjoined, then, was the strike by
employees whose only grievance against their employer was an injury
asserted by another union. That is, what is a legitimate objective for one
group of employees may not be. legitimate for another group.
Heretofore sympathetic strikes and sympathetic picketing have ordinarily
taken the form of activity by an aggrieved union against a third party who
does business with the employer sought to be coerced.2 5 Such sympathetic
activity has been permitted where an "identity of interest" was found to
exist between the two employers. 26 Thus, a strike was permitted against
contractors who used materials manufactured by the company against which
the principal demands were directed.2 7  Similarly, picketing of the place of
business of a retailer who sold goods manufactured by the employer sought
to be coerced was held to be for a legitimate object.28 But an injunction
was upheld where picketing was against the premises of one who used a
non-union product solely as a consumer. 29 Where an "identity of interest"
has been found to exist, the fact that injury results to the employer against
whom there is no grievance "does not in itself constitute a justification for
issuing an injunction." 80
shorter hours or spreading of employment opportunities. And resistance to improved
equipment or more efficient methods may be but a way of expressing, without the aid
of a lawyer, the desire for continued employment and earnings. Both may be but
means of safeguarding labor from receiving-the entire immediate shock of technological
change."
23. See cases cited supra note 1. See also (1939) 8 INT. JuRuo. Ass'N BuL, 29.
24. Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 353, 34 N. E. (2d) 349, 351
(1941), cert. denied, 10 U. S. L. WEEK 3123 (1941).
25. For a discvssion of the effect of anti-injunction statutes on this type of sym-
pathetic strike, see Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1064.
26. Where no "identity of interest" exists, the strike takes the form of an illegal
"secondary boycott," with labor, rather than patronage, being withheld. See Eskin,
The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion" in Labor Disputes (1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv.
456, 461.
27. Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917).
28. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); cf. Forten-
bury v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 106 P. (2d) 411 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. 1940).
29. Canepa v. "John Doe", 277 N. Y. 52, 12 N. E. (2d) 790 (1938). See also
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Hawley, 176 Misc. 821, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 936 (Sup.
Ct. 1941); Weil & Co. v. "John Doe", 168 Misc. 211, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 559 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
30. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 410, 182 N. E. 63, 65 (1932),
cert. denied, 288 U. S. 606 (1932).
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The "identity-of-interest" concept, moreover, seems to have been utilized
for deciding the legality of sympathetic strikes of the type found in the
principal case, although there has been no mention of the phrase. In'Aubern
Draying Company v. Wardcll3 l all union members in the city of Auburn
threatened to withdraw their patronage from any one who dealt with an
employer who refused to require his employees to become memhers of a
union; they were enjoined. But in Willson & Adams Company v. Pearce32
a strike was permitted against employees who used materials delivered by
non-union drivers, on the ground that the transportation of the materias
was a necessary part of the construction upon which the employees were
engaged.P
There are sound considerations of policy which favor the adoption of
the "unity-of-interest" test for determining the legitimacy of strikes by em-
ployees in sympathy with an aggrieved union.34 The concept represents a
compromise between a desire to localize the area of conflict and a reluc-
tance to interfere with labor's right to act in concert. It provides a flexible
criterion for limiting action by employees to cases in which they have an
interest beyond their standing as workers. In the principal case an "identity
of interest" is readily found in the fact that the stagehands were employed
by the same company against which the musicians had a grievance. In
the Pearce case the striking employees were found to have a sufficient
"identity of interest" with the aggrieved union because the businesses of
their two employers were closely related. It would seem, moreover, that
a court would be more willing to allow a strike where there was no injury
to an employer who was a stranger to the dispute.2
Opera On Tour, Incorporated v. Weber, therefore, not only replaces "labor
dispute" with "legitimate object" as the vital criterion; it replaces it with
a narrow construction of "legitimate object." The substitution itself is to
be regretted, because a finding that an objective is lawful implies that the
court has given its approval; whereas the recognition that a "labor dispute"
exists means only that the contest is not the concern of the courts except
31. 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919).
32. 264 N. Y. 521, 191 N. E. 545 (1934), aff',i. 240 App. Div. 718, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 624 (1934).
33. Compare with the Pearce case Kimbel v. Lumber and Saw Mill Workers
Union, 189 'Wash. 416, 65 P. (2d) 1066 (1937).
34. The legality of sympathetic picketing seems hardly plien tu duubt. See A. S.
Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N. Y. Supp. 946 (1934); New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938). The fact that the picketers
are members of a union should not make any difference. But see Simun v. Sch. ach-
man, 301 Mass. 573, 18 N. E. (2d) 1 (1938). The case is entirely different from the
situation presented in Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Int'l Alliance v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 294 N. VN. 632 (Wis. 19401, rch deeed, 236 Wis. 32,
295 N. W. 634 (1941), (1941) 54 I-L-m. L. REV. 692, w\here the picketing '.as by a
minority union. In the case suggested the picketers would be members uf a sympathetic
union.
35. See Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 537, 543.
1941]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
to the extent that forbidden means are used.30 But when it is coupled with
new limitations upon the legitimate objectives of labor activity, the flood-
gates of judicial intervention are opened wide. This constitutes an unfor-
tunate departure from the traditional New York view that the courts are
not competent arbiters of the conflict between economic groups.
POWER TO AFFECT STOCKHOLDERS' INTERESTS
IN CHAPTER Xl PROCEEDING*
IN SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Company1 the Supreme
Court took an initial step toward solution of the problem created by omission
in the Chandler Act 2 of a test for determining which corporations might avail
themselves of Chapter X1 and which must resort to the more rigorously
supervised machinery of Chapter X.3 Although it based its decision largely
on other grounds, the court incidentally stated in that case that a large cor-
poration with publicly-held securities 4 could not file a petition under
Chapter XI. It found sanction for its decision in the general requirement,
specifically recognized in Section 366(3), that a plan must be found to be
"fair and equitable and feasible" as that phrase has been understood in its
36. It is not to be supposed that in Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d)
547 (1938) the Court of Appeals gave its approval of the principle of the closed shop;
or that in Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932),
cert. denied, 288 U. S. 606 (1932) it approved of the picketing of an employer with
whom the union had a collective bargaining agreement. The court, however, recognized
the non-legal nature of the dispute in both cases.
*In re May Oil Burner Corp., 38 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1941).
1. 310 U. S. 434 (1940).
2. B4NXRUPTCy Acr, 52 STAT. 840, 11 U. S. C. §§ 1-1103 (Supp. 1938). Sections
of Chapter X are numbered from 101 to 276; Chapter XI from 301 to 399. Subsequent
citations to the Act will refer to section numbers only.
3. The literature dealing with the defective interrelation of the two chapters is
abundant. See Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization:
Chapters X & XI of the Bankruptcy Act (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334; Gerdes, Recent
Developments in Corporate Reorganization Under The Bankruptcy Act (1940), 26 VA.
L. REv. 999; Hueston, Corporate Reorganization Under The Chandler Act (1939)
A3 CORP. REORG. 35; Levin, Weintraub, and Singer, The Third Year of Arrangcncnts
Under The Bankruptcy Act: Crossroads and Signposts (1941) 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv.
375, 376-380; Mulder, Ambiguities In The Chandler Act (1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. Rav.
10, 15-20.
4. Realty had over $3,700,000 in bonds outstanding at the time it filed under
Chapter XI for an arrangement of its unsecured obligation on its guarantee of $7,000,000
worth of first mortgage bonds of its subsidiary. For a discussion of the corporate
structure of Realty, see (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 927.
5. Section 366(2) provides for confirmation of the plan upon a finding that
"it is for the best interests of creditors." Like the "fair and equitable and feasible"
test of §366(3), its fundamental premise is that all the property of the debtor must
be used to satisfy the claims of creditors. See Rostow and Cutler, supra note 3, at
1360. But see Levin and Weintraub, supra note 3, at 386, 387.
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long history before the Court.G That rule requires, in many cases of cor-
porate reorganization, that stock interests be modified or eliminated.7 But
Chapter XI, the Court contended, makes no provision for the elimination of
stockholders.3 Therefore, a corporation for which no "fair and equitable"
plan could be achieved without modification of stock interests can not be
reorganized in a Chapter XI proceeding, and a petition filed under that
Chapter by such a corporation must be dismissed, unless the junior interests
make an additional contribution.9
The Court said, however, that its rule did not mean that no corporation
could be reorganized under Chapter XI. It indicated that the policy of the
Boyd case would be satisfied without alteration of stock interests for small,
closely-held corporations in which the subordinate creditors or stockholders
were the managers of a business the present going-concern value of which
could be preserved only through their continued management. Creditors in
such cases are given full priority as to all assets available to them; no new
contribution is required to justify the continued participation of junior in-
terests, because their claim is not one which could be made available to
creditors. 10 Under the Realty case, then, it is necessary to answer this ques-
6. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913); Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prod. Co., 303 U. S. 106 (1939). For a good discussion of recent ampli-
fications of the Boyd rule, see Comment (1941) 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 399, 459-463.
The development of the doctrine is traced in Rostow and Cutler, sipra note 3, at
1346-1360.
7. SEC v. United States Realty & Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434, 452-454 (1940).
See (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 1245.
. Section 356 provides: "An arrangement within the meaning of this chapter
shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of unsecured creditors generally
or of some class of them, upon any terms or for any consideration?' The inference
is dear that secured creditors may not be affected by an arrangement. The absence
of specific authority to affect stockholders' rights, however, should not be conclusive.
But see In re Novia Candy Co., Bankr. Docket No. 40184 (E. D. N. Y. 1941) where
an insolvent corporation with unsecured debts of q7,000 filed its petition under Chapter
X because it was felt that Chapter XI provided no machinery for the elimination of
stockholders who were in dispute over the provisions of the arrangement. Similar
situations have prompted suggestions that Chapter XI be amended to allow involuntary
petitions by creditors, as well as a procedure for eliminating stockholders upon a finding
that the corporation was insolvent. See Report of Committee on Creditors a:d Arrange-
wnents With Creditors, National Bankruptcy Conference (1940) A. CoRp. REo:o. 80, 81-82.
Section 216 gives specific power to a Chapter X court to adjust or eliminate stock-
holder interests.
9. In the event of insolvency, stockholders are allowed to participate if they
make a contribution in money or its substantial equivalent. See Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939). The contribution must be necessary for
the new concern and sufficient to justify the participation of the stockholders. First
-Nat. Bank of Herkimer v. Poland Union, 109 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
10. The Court said in the Realty case: "In cases where subordinate creditors or
stockholders are the managers of its business, the preservation of going-concern value
through their continued management of the business may compensate for reduction
of the claims of the prior creditors without alteration of the management's interests,
which would otherwise be required by the Boyd case." SEC v. United States Realty
& Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434, 454 (1940).
1941]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tion before determining whether a petition under Chapter XI is properly
filed: Will it be necessary, in order to achieve a "fair and equitable" plan
for a corporation, that stockholders' interests be modified? If so, reorgani-
zation is possible only under Chapter X. 11
This argument in the Realty case constitutes a severe limitation upon the
usefulness of Chapter XI. One of the avowed purposes of the Chapter was
to make available a judicial remedy for small corporations which in the past
had crowded the Section 77B dockets.12 The composition device of Section
12 had proved an unsatisfactory vehicle for corporate rehabilitation la and
was but little used. 14 As a result, many small corporations, some of which
desired only an adjustment of their unsecured indebtedness, sought to obtain
relief under Section 77B. To combat the flood of petitions, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York adopted the rule that a Section 77B
petition must state facts showing why relief was not available under Section
12."5 This policy was included in the Chandler Act, which requires that a
Chapter X petition state why relief is not obtainable under Chapter XI11
To further this policy Chapter XI liberalized the composition features of
Section 12 by providing that any arrangement may include any plan of the
debtor for a satisfaction of its unsecured debts on any terms, the considera-
tion for which may be stock of a new corporation to whom the debtor's
assets have been sold.'
7
11. For discussions of the inadequacies of state reorganization devices as an alter-
native, see Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1443; (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1090.
12. See Hearings Before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced
and adopted in 1938 as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 36, 39, 136.
13. The reasons why § 12 was unsatisfactory are thoroughly discussed in SEC RE-
PORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND
FUNCTIONS OF PROTEcrIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMxMITTEES (1940) Pt. VIII, 72-82.
The Report says at page 74: "Moreover, it is significant that the breakdown of the Sec-
tion 12 composition procedure . . . was due in large measure to the general failure of
individual creditors to take an active and continued interest in the proceedings."
14. See note 3 supra. Many of the obstacles to reorganization through § 12 have
been removed. See In re Romec Pump Co., 31 F. Supp. 389 (D. Ohio 1939), appeal
dismissed sub isum. B. K. Elliot Co. v. Romec Pump Co., 111 F. (2d) 896 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940). The strict construction of § 12 and the requirement that the debtor be
bankrupt were among the factors accounting for the unpopularity of the composition
device. In re Malkan, 261 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); In re Cornell, 186 Fed. 859
(S. D. N. Y. 1911); In re Northampton Portland Cement Co., 185 Fed, 542 (E. D.
Pa. 1911); In re Woodend, 133 Fed. 593 (S. D. N. Y. 1904). Successful compositions,
however, have been effected. See, for example, In re Realty Assoc. Sec. Corp., 6 F.
Supp. 549 (E. D. N. Y. 1934), aff'd sub. noin. Realty Assoc. Sec. Corp. v. O'Connor,
295 U. S. 295 (1934), rev'g, 74 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Oriole Phonograph
Co. v. Kansas City Fabrics Prod. Co., 34 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929), ccrt.
denied, 280 U. S. 609 (1930).
15. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., BANKRUPT& RULES (1938), Rule 77B-2(i).
16. Section 130(7). In the event of failure to do so, transfer of the proceedings
to Chapter X is expedited by § 147.
17. See §§306(1), 306(2), 313, 356, 357(5), 367(1), 393(2), 395, 396, 397. For
a discussion of the implications of these sections, see 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th




A recent case, In re May Oil Burner Corporation,18 presented the question
of the desirability of allowing a small corporation, the going concern value
of which was not dependent upon the continued management of its stock-
holders, to avail itself of the speedy and economical machinery of Chapter XI.
A Maryland corporation, unable to meet its maturing debts and threatened
with liquidation, proposed to transfer all its assets to a newly-formed cor-
poration in return for all the stock of the transferee. °3 Trade debts of
$11,000 were to be paid in cash, while five noteholders, whose claims totaled
$270,000, were to receive one share of $1 par common stock in the pur-
chasing company for an equal principal amount of their claims.20 The re-
mainder of the securities issued, 95,635 shares, were to be held by the debtor
as its sole assets. Unanimous creditor assent was obtained, but upon the
objection of a stockholder controlling over one-third of the voting power
in the old corporation, the court, relying on the dictum of the Rcaity case,
found that the absence in Chapter XI of specific power to modify stock-
holders' rights made it impossible to confirn the plan.2 '
Clearly the dissenting stockholder's rights were affected. Previously his
one-third voting power gave him an effective lever of negative control over
the management; under the proposed plan this negative control would be
exercised over a management holding only a quarter interest in the same
business. Moreover, he was deprived 6f his pre-emptive right to maintain his
pro rata share of ownership and control. Perhaps, however, lie received a
larger share of participation in the new corporation than the "fair and equit-
able" rule permits. There was no evidence that the going-concern value of
the business was inextricably associated with existing stock interests.2 2 If
there had been a finding of insolvency, therefore, compliance with the Boyd
doctrine required the elimination of the old stockholders from participation.23
18. 38 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1941).
19. A previous plan to issue preferred stock allowing preemptive rights to existing
shareholders and to satisfy creditors with the cash received on sales and/or unsold
stock was rejected by the creditors. Petition of Corporation, Feb. 4, 1941; Order of
District Court dismissing proceedings, No. 9575, March 3, 1941.
20. The power of the debtor to classify creditors is important in mustering assents.
See Address of W. R. Montgomery (1938) 13 J. N. S. REF. BANKo. 17, 1& On
possible limitations of this power, see (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 892, 896. Note that
Chapter XI, §362(1), provides for acceptance by a majority of creditors in amount
and number, while Chapter X, § 179, requires two-thirds in amount only.
21. But in the Realty case the omission of authority in Chapter XI for a preliminary
hearing to determine the appropriateness of relief under that Chapter did not deter the
majority from deciding that a Chapter XI court had such power. SEC v. United States
Realty & Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434, 455-457 (1940).
22. Since there were about 170 stockholders, the opposite would seem to be true.
See PooR's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL (1941) 3278.
23. Pursuant to the court's suggestion, the issue of the fairness of the plan was
submitted to arbitration by agreement. Included in the agreement were proxies by
more than two-thirds of the stockholders authorizing the necessary corporate action
if the plan were found to be "fair and equitable." It was so found and has been put
into effect. Thus, there was a return to the out-of-court settlement which it had been
hoped Chapter XI would eliminate. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 38.
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A proper determination of the solvency of any corporation is possible only
upon a valuation of assets based on a capitalization of prospective future
earnings.24 Since no valuation was made in the principal case, the court
erred in finding the plan to be "fair and equitable," although its refusal to
confirm the plan was based on the dictum of the Realty case, denying the
Chapter XI court authority to alter stockholder interests. But without a
valuation it was impossible for the court to decide that stockholders' rights
must be modified or eliminated in order to achieve a fair plan 25 and, there-
fore, that the Chapter XI petition should be dismissed. The effect of the
rule of the Realty case is, therefore, to compel the court to determine the very
thing- the extent to which stockholder interests must be altered for the
plan to be "fair and equitable"-which it has a duty to find at the conclusion
of a long investigation and which it is able to decide accurately only after
it has made such an investigation.2 6
The Supreme Court in the Realty case relied chiefly upon the size of the
corporation, the need for modification of the secured debt in order "to make
reorganization feasible, the public-holding of securities, and the need for
a unitary reorganization of the parent corporation with its subsidiary. These
are criteria which a bankruptcy court is able to apply at the time a petition
is filed. They are, moreover, sufficiently precise to enable a court to decide
which is the proper chapter in view of the purpose which each was in-
tended to perform. 27 Reliance upon these standards would seem to make
Chapter XI available to a corporation of the type presented in the principal
case. The corporation and its secured debt are relatively unburdensome;
the public-holding of securities is very limited; and no subsidiary company
is involved.
The absence of express statutory authority, therefore, should not have
been held to deprive a Chapter XI court of the power to alter stock-
holders' rights, since no "fair and equitable" plan can be formulated without
such power. This would seem to be particularly true for the type of plan
presented by the May Oil Burner Company, since both Section 35626 and
Section 39529 seem to contemplate an arrangement in which a new cor-
poration is created to carry on the business of the debtor.
Because the corporation had liabilities in excess of $250,000, however,
it might well be argued that Chapter XI should be unavailable. If the
petition had been filed under Chapter X, it would have been the duty of
24. See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941);
Comment (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 85.
25. Yet, the court, relying on balance sheet valuations, found the plan to be "fair
and equitable."
26. If a petition is filed under Chapter X, the court is likewise under a duty to
see whether stockholders must be affected, since the petition is not filed in good faith if
adequate relief is obtainable under Chapter XI, § 146(2).
27. See Rostow and Cutler, loc. cit. supra note 3.
28. See note 8 supra.
29. This section provides in part: "... no income or profit . . . shall . . . be
deemed to have accrued to or to have been realized by a debtor or a corporation organ-
ized or made use of for effectuating an arrangement under this chapter. .. ."
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the judge to appoint a disinterested trustee.30 But this requirement was
inserted into Chapter X primarily because of the control which the manage-
ment can exert upon the public investor through solicitation of acceptances
and formulation of the plan where the financial structure is complicateo!
and investor interest widely spread.31 It would seem to be an unduly strict
construction to compel the use of Chapter X whenever the debtur's liabilitkik
exceeded $250,000 if, by the criteria of the Realty case, the corporatiun seems
otherwise better adapted to Chapter XI.
If Chapter XI is made available to corporations the guing-co.ncern value
of which is not dependent upon the continuation of the present managenlnt
and which are insolvent or have liabilities slightly exceeding $250,000, thcre
are still important safeguards against abuses. The perils of debtor control
are lessened by the power of the court to require an indemnity bond during
the period of administration3 2 and to have a receiver take pussession. 3 The
threat of refusal of confirmation and adjudication provide other potential
weapons.3 4 The court may still exercise an "independent and informed
judgment" through its powers of examination and right to appoint appraisers
upon the application of any party in interest. 5 The vitality of these safe-
guards should dispel the fear that the protective functions of Chapter X will
be thwarted, thus leaving no valid reason for the clumsy limitation imposed
on Chapter XI by a reaffirmance of the dictum of the Really case.
DETERMINATION OF THE "APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT"
IN MULTI-PLANT ENTERPRISES
THE Wagner Act' has imposed upon the National Labor Relations Buard
the dual function of preventing unfair labor practices 2 and certifying exclu-
sive agencies of employees for collective bargaining.3 Early administration
of the Act was, of necessity, largely concerned with prevention o.f unfair
30. Section 156. This provision was included only after considerable controversy.
See Hearings Before Subcommittee of the Senah Judiciary ComptmtIee o: II. R. S010,
75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937-1938) 28, 83, 202.
31. For a discussion of the trustee's duties in connection with the fo~rmulation of
the plan, see Teton, Reorganization Revised (1939) 48 YAL.E L J. 573, 581- 53. The
fact that the trustee has other important duties, enumerated in § 167, should not compl'l
a proceeding under Chapter X when Chapter XI seems otherwise more appropriate.
32. Section 326.
33. Section 332.
34. Section 376(1), (2).
35. Sections 302, 333, 336(3). Moreover, the right to an appraisal and hearing
on the valuation would obviate any complaint by dissenting stockholders on due pro-
cess grounds.
1. 49 ST.AT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (Supp. 1939).
2. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (Supp. 1939).
3. 49 ST.LT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (Supp. 1939).
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practices. But with the apparent collapse of employer opposition to unionism
per se 4 it may be expected that the Board will place greater emphasis oil
representation cases. Much controversy r arises preliminary to certification
of any labor organization as the majority representative, and before ail
employer can be ordered to bargain collectively with his employees, in the
determination of the particular bargaining units.0 It is contended by some
that each trade should be permitted to negotiate separately while others
advocate unified industrial units." Questions have arisen as to the inclusion
in the unit of supervisory and "fringe" groups such as service and clerical
workers. s A most significant dispute has developed between proponents of
representation on an individual plant basis and those desiring more extensive
collective bargaining on an employer-wide scale.
The Labor Board's treatment of this "plant-employer" unit controversy has
undergone radical change with recent shifts in its pqrsonnel. The issues
involved are brought into sharp focus by the recent case of Pittsburg Plate
Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board in which the discretion of the
Board to determine the multiple plant unit was upheld by the Supreme Court. t
4. Henry Ford Signs CIO Contract, N. Y. Times, June 21, 1941, p. 1, cot. 3.
Girdler Will Sign, Business Week, July 19, 1941, p. 49, col. 1.
5. For general discussion see Cohen, The "Appropriate Unit" under the National
Labor Relations Act (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 1110; Stix, The Appropriate Barqaininq
Unit Under the Wagner Act (1938) 23 WAsH. U. L. Q. 156; Rice, Determination of
Employee Representatives (1938) 5 LAw & CON'TEMP. PRon. 188, 200; Comment (1937)
12 Wis. L. Ry. 367.
6. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159(a) (b) (Supp. 1939).
§ 9(a) : "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, that any individual employee or a group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer."
§ 9(b) : "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to
employees the full benefit of their right to self organization and to collective bargain-
ing, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Chapter, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof."
7. This is a field in which the AFL and the CIO have frequently clashed. For
discussion, see (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 339; (1939) 6 U. oF Cui. L. Ray. 673; (1940)
34 ILL. L. REv. 852.
8. See 4 NLRB REP. (1939) 93.
9. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 61 Sup. Ct. 908 (U. S. 1941), aff'g,
113 F. (2d) 698 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940). By this action the court approved a prior certifi-
cation of the union on an employer-wide basis, 10 NLRB 1111 (1939), and enforced a
Board order that the employer cease refusing to bargain collectively, 15 NLRB 515
(1939).
The court also held that the Board had sufficient facts to support its findings
and that it had the right to exclude certain evidence. A dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Stone held that the Board's actions were erroneous and that the inde-
pendent Crystal City Glass Worker's Union had a right to produce evidence indicating
dissimilarities of the Missouri plant. The Board had ruled out this union's contentions
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The unit which had been established in that case encompassed six related1"
plants of the Pittsburg company in line with the settled presumption 11
of the prior Board' 2 in favor of employer-wide organization. By a striking
coincidence a reconstructed Board majority had, just prior to the decision,
reversed the basic policy and permitted negotiation by an individual plant
of the Libby-Owens-Ford Company.13
In the Pittsburg case five of the company's plants had been organized by
a CIO Union. 14 The sixth, at Crystal City, Missouri, was controlled by aM
independent labor organization.'3 In 1938 the CIO, knowing that its strength
elsewhere could prevail over the dissident majority in the Crystal City
factory, and secure certification for itself as sole bargaining agent, petitioned
the Board for an all-inclusive unit. The petition was resisted by both the
company and the unaffiliated union, both demanding the creation of a separate
plant unit.
The broader unit was chosen' 6 by the prior Board in the belief that effec-
tiveness of collective bargaining depended largely upon equalizing the strength
on the strength of an earlier NLRB stipulation finding the union to be company
dominated. 8 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1938). Mr. Justice Stone objected to the fact that
only the Labor Board and the corporation had taken part in this prior proceeding.
10. The Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. has five divisions: commercial, chemical, paint,
brush, and flat glass. This representation petition included only seven (f the nine
plants in the flat glass division and omitted the other categories.
11. See R.C.A. Communications, 9 N.L.R.B. 915 (1933); Inland Steel, 9 N.LR.B.
783 (1938); Sound Timber Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 844 (1938); C. A. Lund, 6 N.LILB. 423
(1938). It must be remembered that the presumption involved relates only to the
situation in which the employer unit is requested by a bona fide union and not when
a sole labor organization requests a plant unit.
12. The "prior" Board can be said to have remained in power so long as Chairman
Madden and E. S. Smith constituted a majority. William Leiserson, who replaced
D. ,V. Smith in June 1939, frequently dissented during this period in cases involving
the "appropriate unit", and, more specifically, the "plant-employer" controversy. With
the replacement in 1940 of 'Madden by H. A. Millis as chairman, the Board can be
said to have been "reconstructed" in that Leiserson now was generally joined in the
majority by Millis on these problems, with E. S. Smith dissenting.
13. 31 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1941). It is perhaps an e.xaggeration to say that this
case represented a complete reversal of policy. There had been indications that such
a change was coming as early as the Chrysler [13 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1939)] and Briggs
[13 X.L.R.B. 1326 (1939)] cases where a divided Board had allowed separate plant elec-
tions in view of a recent split in the United Automobile Workers Union. Boardmember
Leiserson's vigorous dissent in the second Pittsburg Plate Glass case [15 N.L.IB.
515 (1939) at 530] was another sign that a new tendency was emerging. Although the
decisions in U. S. Rubber Co. [20 N.L.R.B. 473 (1940)] and Hood Ru!ibcr Co.
[20 IN.L.R.B. 485 (1940)] would seem generally to conform to the regular exception.
to the employer unit rule they might also be regarded as indicative of a Board change.
It was not, however, until the Libby-Owens-Ford decision that a new policy could
definitely be observed.
14. Federation of Flat Glass Vorkers (CIO).
15. The Crystal City Glass Workers Union. See note 9 .supra.
16. 10 N.L.RtB. 1111 (1939).
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of management and labor.'7 Thus the national organization of industry should
be matched, it was thought, by the development of similarly expansive and
unified labor organization. Splitting the unit would perhaps aggravate the
possibility of petty bickering between rival union groups and grant an unfair
advantage to the employer."' Employees, so divided, would be vulnerable to
the familiar device of "playing off" hostile plants one against another through
the shifting of orders and materials.' 9
Moreover, the Board stressed the identity of interests of all workers of
any employer. Employees everywhere were thought to have the same funda-
mental bargaining objectives: higher wages, shorter hours and improved
working conditions. Consequently, it was considered unfair to allow any
group possible preferences. If the workers in one plant were granted advan-
tages over and above those received in another area, disharmony might
arise from unjustified variations in conditions.
20
Furthermore, the position was thought to be more in accord with the
normal development of organized labor. As a general rule bona fide unions
seemed to operate on a national scale. On the other hand company unions
quite often were found entrenched in certain specified localities. If the
intent of the Act was to strengthen genuine unionism and the concomitant
elimination of employer domination, the creation of large scale'units seemed
to be a direct implementation of this policy.
2 1
17. See 4 NLRB REP. 90-91 (1939). Immediately preceding this statement the
Board has listed generally its criteria in relation to this problem as follows: "(1) the
history, extent, and type of organization of the employees; (2) the history of their col-
lective bargaining, including any contracts; (3) the history, extent, and type of organ!-
zation, and the collective bargaining, of employees of other employers in the same in-
dustry; (4) the relationship between any proposed unit or units and the employer's
organization, management, and operation of his business, including the geographical
location of the various plants or parts of the system; and (5) the skill, wages, working
conditions, and work of the employees." 4 NLRB RFr. 90 (1939).
18. It might be expected that for reasons of economy and simplicity employers
would favor large scale as opposed to plant units. This is not the case. Generally
employers appear to favor dividing the jurisdiction. This may well be due to the fact
that the more militant unions often organize on an industrial scale.
19. See NLRB v. C. A. Lund Co., 103 F. (2d) 815 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), aff'g
C. A. Lund Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 423 (1938), where the court states:
"If Lund may deal with the employees of the two plants as separate units it is
believed that collective bargaining would be a farce and that Lund, because of hi
hostility to the Union, would evade the purpose and intent of the law by transferring
business from one plant to the other as his interest dictated according to the unit with
which he could make the most favorable bargain. In other words Lund would be
in a position where he could force competition between the two groups of his em-
ployees to their detriment and his gain."
20. See 4 NLRB REmP. 90-91 (1939). It would seem equally conceivable, however,
that preferences to one union would only act as a spur to the activity of its rival.
21. Cf. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 375 (1939) (In this case the broad
unit was, in fact, denied because it was requested by a company-dominated union);
See also Phelps-Dodge Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 624 (1938) (intercraft controversy).
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Finally the Board had previously indicated that if there were a history
of large scale organization22 or an existing contract covering all plants -3
or if the employer's activities were highly integrated2 4 and striking simi-
larities could be shown in general working. conditions,2 the creation of an
employer unit would be held to be justified. These arguments, however,
were not conclusive, and no definite prediction of Board conduct could he
made on the basis of their non-existence.2
Exceptions to the employer unit rule were allowed only where the plant
in dispute was as yet completely unorganized,2 or where there was a con-
sistent history of individual plant bargaining,2 8 or where the broad unit
would serve the interests of a company dominated organization. 29 The
larger unit might also be disallowed if it were shown that the employer's
labor policy was completely decentralized with full power over employee
relations in the hands of individual factory managers.-"
In the Libby-Owens-Ford case a CIO union had previously been certified
as majority representative of an employer-wide unit of related plants despite
the existence of an AFL majority at Parkersburg, West Virginia.3 The
union now charged that the company had committed an unfair labor practice
in refusing to bargain collectively with the certified union. The employer
defended his refusal by denying the appropriateness of the unit determined.
Accepting this contention the Board reversed its earlier decision and allowed
a separation of the dissenting plant from the general unit.
In view of Libby-Owens-Ford -32 and succeeding decisions,3 it can now
be said that, for the present at least, the predisposition towards employer units
is dead. Instead there seems to have been developed a new set of criteria
utilized in selecting the appropriate unit.34 Emphasis has now shifted to the
22. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 446 (1939').
23. Cf. Shipowners' Association of the Pacific, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002, 1022 tI938).
24. Todd Shipyards, 5 N.L.R.B. 20 (1938).
25. United Shipyards. 5 N.L.R.B. 742 (1938).
26. See Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1111 (1939).
27. Colorado Builders' Supply Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 29 (1939).
28. Ohio Foundry Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 701 (1937).
29. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 375 (1939).
30. Cf. Hood Rubber Co., 20 N.L.R.B. 485 (1940).
31. See Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1470 (1939).
32. 31 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1941).
33. See Shipowners' Association of the Pacific, 32 N.L.R.B., Nu. 124 (1941);
American Bridge Co., 9 LAB. RE.. REP. 11 (1941).
The Shipowners' case involved a multi-employer unit previuusly created by a
Board decision. 7 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938). The factors involved in the creation of
these jurisdictions differ substantially from those involved in the determination of
employer units. [1940] Wis. L. REv. 556. But in this specific case it may be said
that similar considerations were involved as in the problem at hand. Tie reversal f
the earlier determination is a clear example of the new Buard policy.
34. The differing points of view of Board members on unit problems have been
clearly brought out in several cases. Leiserson, frmt:r chairman uf tile National
Mediation Board, is the sponsor of the "binding contract" doctrine which would
prevent changes of bargaining units in the course of collective agreement4. Where
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premise that it is undemocratic to allow workers in organized plants
to choose bargaining agents for employees in areas which are either un-
organized or unionized by rival groups.3, The spirit of the Wagner Act
is said to be the free selection of employee representatives; disregard of the
desires of locally isolated bodies of workers by the creation of employer-
wide units is in direct violation of this cardinal principle. The recalcitrant
plant must be allowed a separate vote before it can be asked to submit to
unified negotiations. 6
The new Board also appears to have carried over into the plant-employer
dispute the "binding contract" doctrine frequently applied' in bargaining
unit controversies between craft and industrial unions.37 Under this principle
there can be no change of bargaining unit where there is an existing con-
tract; it is the Board's duty to respect what is held to indicate labor's
own choice. The binding contract doctrine, moreover, purports to diminish
inter-union strife by preventing "raids" of organized fields by rival groups.88
Where contracts exist, therefore, bargaining rights established by them for
workers in any given plant will probably be honored by the Board, and the
plant allowed to choose whether it shall be represented by the broader
unit or bargain for itself. 39 Conversely, where a company has an exist-
ing contract with an employer-wide union, consistent application of the
doctrine would seem to result in a freezing of the larger unit. In "craft-
there is no contract in existence he will usually allow separate votes among craft
members or in individual plants to determine representatives. In general, Chairman
Harry A. Millis appears to accept Leiserson's position. Former Chairman Madden
was a strong supporter of the Globe doctrine [3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937)] allowing separate
votes for crafts, but was disposed to favor employer units in the plant-employer con-
troversy. Edwin S. Smith has consistently upheld large scale bargaining where desired
by a bona fide union, at the expense of smaller jurisdictions. See American Can Co.,
13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939), 49 YALE L. J. 339.
35. This is, in essence, the position of Leiserson as expressed in his dissent in
the second Pittsburg Plate Glass case, 15 N.L.R.B. 515, 530 (1939).
36. Of course if the plant selects the union contending for an employer-wide unit
as its representative a new problem is posed. It is probable that the Board will
consider at that time a second petition for an employer unit. See Chrysler Corp.,
13 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1939), 17 N.L.R.B. 737 (1939).
But see Leiserson's concurring opinion in Iowa Utilities, 15 N.L.RB. 580 (1939),
where he denies the Board's power to create the smaller unit if in the light of election
returns a system-wide certification is not justified.
37. See American Can Corp., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939), 49 YALE L, J. 339;
cf. (1940) 34 ILL. L. Rv. 852.
38. In view of the fact that the unit is frozen it is probable that the bargaining
agent as well will remain the same under the binding contract doctrine. This would
discourage unions contemplating an organizing campaign where the employer is already
under a labor agreement.
39. See Leiserson's dissenting opinion, Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 515,
530 (1939). Since the appointment of Millis in place of Madden this dissent probably
represents the majority opinion of the Board. No case, however, appears to have
directly passed upon the issue.
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industrial" disputes, however, exceptions have been made where it is shown
that dissenting groups always objected to their inclusion in the unit,40 or
where such bodies have secured a collateral understanding with the con-
tracting union during the course of the agreement.41 These and possibly
other exceptions may be applied to the plant-employer dispute to allow
individual factories a vote on whether or not to adhere to the general unit.
A third group of arguments in favor of plant units may be premised on the
existence of facts peculiar to particular situations 4 -- matters of custom, tradi-
tion, cost-of-living, or wage differentials. For instance it may be that a wage
rise desirable in many of an employer's plants would be disastrous to employ-
ment in an area where other costs are relatively higher. Factors such as these
may modify the general precept that workers' interests are universally iden-
tical and make plant bargaining desirable. Board decisions, however, appear
rarely to have noticed these significant considerations.
The Board's reversal of policy has not been without criticism. By its
very terms the new position discourages the creation of the large scale units,
considered by many essential to the creation of an equalized bargaining
relationship between management and labor.43 In the name of "democracy"
small groups of workers are given the power to cut themselves off from
employees with similar skills and identical tasks. It does not seem essential
to the concept of free representation that the workers' selection be made
on the smallest of desired scales. Nor is there any inference in the Act
that voting on an employer-wide basis is any less democratic than voting
plant-by-plant."
Moreover, application of the binding contract doctrine places the burden
upon labor to select the unit and prohibits subsequent alteration by admin-
istrative action. Such a policy seems to limit exercise of Board initiative
to promote successful collective bargaining and relegates the Board to mere
ministerial activities in carrying out these important functions.45 Thus it
has been attacked as preserving labor peace only at the expense of labor
strength.
The problem of the appropriate bargaining unit should he analyzed by
weighing the gain to a minority through separate plant bargaining against
the loss to the majority. This balancing of interests involves the considera-
tion of such factors as plant peculiarities, labor history as expressed in past
contracts, repercussions of isolated bargaining, the success abroad of industry
40. See Leiserson's concurring opinion, Chicago Malleable Castings Co., 16 N.L.R.B.
15 (1939).
41. See Leiserson's concurring opinion, B. F. Goodrich Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 165 (1939).
42. These differences were stressed by the excluded evidence in the Pittsburg
Plate Glass Case, 61 Sup. Ct. 903 (U. S. 1941).
43. See dissenting opinions of Edwin S. Smith, Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 31
N.L.R.B., No. 38 (1941); Shipowners' Association of the Pacific, 32 X.L.R.B. Xu. 124
(1941).
44. The Act specifically mentions the employer unit as one of those which may
be appropriate. 49 STaT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159(b) (Supp. 1939).
45. See E. S. Smith, concurring, American Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252, 1253 (1939).
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wide negotiations, 46 employer good faith, the extent of employee organiza-
tion, and integration of employer labor policy. Any preconceived "policy"
tends to do injustice in the individual case.
MICHAEL F. MA'riR t
RECOVERY FOR UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES AND EXPENSE
UNDER MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS*
ORDINARILY a party who contracts to perform work for a fixed sum will
not be excused or become entitled to additional compensation simply because
unanticipated difficulties are encountered.' In drafting municipal construc-
tion contracts, attorneys for municipalities have sought to bolster and to
extend this rule by including clauses designed to place upon the contractor
the risk not only of all such unexpected contingencies but also of necessary
alterations. These standardized clauses provide that bidders must make a
careful, personal examination of the proposed work, that the quantities speci-
fied in the plans submitted by the municipality are only approximate estimates
for the purpose of comparing bids, that the municipality reserves the right
to increase or decrease the amount of work or materials, and that the con-
tractor shall make no claim for damages or extra compensation for such
alterations or for work made necessary by unforeseen difficulties. The ortho-
dox rule, together with these clauses which seek to spell out the contractor's
assumption of risk, have not, however, been strictly enforced in the case
of municipal construction contracts.
2
A recent case 3 decided by a federal district court in California illustrates
the tendency of courts to relieve contractors where enforcement of these
clauses would impose too heavy a burden. In 1935 the Public Utilities
Commission of San Francisco solicited bids for the enlargement of a dam.
The specifications submitted to bidders contained the standard risk clauses.
46. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN
AND SWEDEN (U. S. Dep't Labor, 1938) 23, 24.
" Third Year Class, Yale Law School.
* Transbay Construction Co. v. San Francisco, 35 F. Supp. 433 (N. D. Cal. 1940).
1. Carnegie Steel Co. v. United States, 240 U. S. 156 (1916) ; Rowe v. Peabody,
207 Mass. 226, 93 N. E. 604 (1911). See ANSON, CONTRACrS (Corbin's ed. 1930)
§ 376; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS (1938) §§ 1931, 1963.
2. United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 253 U. S. 1 (1920) ; Christie v. United
States, 237 U. S. 234 (1915); Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U. S. 165 (1914);
Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Nelson Co., 116 F. (2d) 823, 833 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); Faber
v. New York, 222 N. Y. 255, 118 N. E. 609 (1918) ; Maney v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla.
77, 300 P.ac. 642, 76 A. L. R. 258, 268 (1931).
3. Transbay Construction Co. v. San Francisco, 35 F. Supp. 433 (N. D. Cal. 1940).
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The necessary excavation was estimated at 30,000 cubic yards. Plaintiff's
bid of $3,457,000, made in reliance upon this representation, was accepted.4
As work on the dam progressed, additional excavation was found necessary
and was ordered by the city's engineer.5 Plaintiff complied with these orders
under protest, and completed the dam fourteen months late. The actual
excavation aggregated 84,000 cubic yards. After the city accepted the work
as satisfactory and waived its claim to liquidated damages arising from the
delayed completion of the dam,( the contractor sued on a quantum meruit
-to recover $834,627- the alleged reasonable value of the additional ex-
cavation. The city rested its defense upon the strict letter of the contract.
The court, however, deemed the contract "abrogated" and permitted the
contractor to recover, justifying this result on the grounds that "circum-
stances unanticipated by the parties made radical changes in the character
and amount of the work to be performed," and rendered it "unjust" to
enforce the contract strictly against the contractor.7
The result reached here is not unusual. Such judicial refusal to enforce
explicit exculpatory clauses where the burden of risk has become unduly
severe, finds justification -rarely articulated in opinions- in the circum-
stances under which most municipal construction contracts are executed and
in the consequences which a rigid enforcement might entail. Where bids
are solicited from scores of contractors on "air-tight" agreements drafted
by skillful municipal attorneys, few contractors can afford to bargain against
the inclusion of arbitrary risk clauses; competing bidders stand ready to
commit themselves if one hesitates.3 It is possible that strict enforcement
of such clauses 9 would lead to a collective increase in the amount of bids
4. According to the opinion, the plaintiff admitted that the city cooperated and
gave all the information it had regarding the proposed work, and the city admitted that
plaintiff could not have made a more accurate estimate upon an independent investi-
gation. Id. at 436.
5. The court deduced from this that it was "apparent that defendant unduly
interfered with plaintiff's performance of the contract and caused additional ep mse
of construction." Ibid.
6. Like most construction contracts, the instant one stipulated liquidated damages
in event of delay. Ini waiving its claim to these damages, the city sought to create
the appearance of fairness on its part. The court, however, construed this action as
an admission that the city was in the wrong. Ibid.
A referee appointed by the court to hold hearings on the value of the additional vorl:
granted the company $790,000.
7. Ibid. The court quoted 6 WILLISTON, CoN'.wCrs (193S) § 1931, and held that
the instant case fitted into the category therein described.
S. Some courts have contended, however, that the contractor is not obliged to
enter into the agreement. Wheeling v. Casey Co., 74 F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935);
Johnson Corp. v. New York, 162 Misc. 665, 295 N. Y. Supp. 547 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
9. The policy favoring strict enforcement was stated by the court in Lentilhon
v. New York, 102 App. Div. 548, 549, 92 N. Y. Supp. 897, 899 (1st Dep't 1905). "The
law requiring the letting of contracts for public improvement to the lowest responsible
bidder may be readily evaded if contractors are to be permitted without seedng a
rescission of them, to obtain the fruits of the contract by performance, and then secure
extra compensation on some theory of mistake."
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by all bidders,10 in which case the municipality would be charged excessively
for those projects in which unforeseen difficulties fail to materialize. In
individual cases, a contractor unable to suffer a large loss through perform-
ance may be forced to repudiate, stopping work on an important public
project. Either result would seem a crude adjustment of risks which might
be more equitably allocated by a court after the extent of the contingency
is known. And a basic reason for permitting recovery, which has impressed
many courts, is that in every case the city, and not the contractor, derives
the benefit of the additional work."
In determining whether these considerations should prevail against the
expressed provisions of the parties, courts have come to rely less on verbal
analysis than on careful scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding individual
agreements. In most cases the right of the contractor to recover has appeared
to resolve itself to a determination of two questions of fact: (1) Was the
contractor reasonable in relying upon the particular representation? (2)
Was the actual deviation from the representation sufficiently material to
justify additional compensation?
In determining the reasonableness of the contractor's reliance, a variety
of factors are relevant, no one of them conclusive. 12 In practice reliance
is apt to be deemed reasonable where the representation is positive and
definite,13 where the plans are prepared in detail by experts,14 where the
facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of municipal officers,'" where the
contractor's opportunity to ascertain the facts for himself is limited, 10 where
the contractor obviously lacks the experience 17 or technical training' s requisite
to detect inaccuracies, and where the municipality employs expert tech-
nicians to supervise the project.' 9 On the other hand, reliance is likely to
be regarded as unreasonable where the representation is a "mere sugges-
10. The court recognized this danger in Drainage District v. Rude, 21 F. (2d) 257,
262 (C. C.A. 8th, 1927).
11. It may be -argued, however, that the unit price for a larger project might be
less than that for the estimated quantity. A court in fixing the amount of recovery
might well consider this point lest it grant the contractor more than he would have
received had the true facts been known when the contract was executed.
12. See Comment (1936) 21 MINN. L. REv. 70; Note (1932) 76 A. L. R. 268,
13. United States v. Smith, 256 U. S. 11 (1921) ; United Constr. Co. v. Haverhill,
9 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Application of Semper, 227 N. Y. 151, 124 N. E.
743 (1919) ; Langley v. Rouss, 85 App. Div. 27, 82 N. Y. Supp. 1082 (2d Dep't 1903).
14. Beck Coal & Lumber Co. v. Peterson Mfg. Co., 237 I1. 250, 86 N. E. 715
(1908); Tide Water Bldg. Co. v. Hammond, 144 App. Div. 920, 129 N. Y. Supp, 355
(1st Dep't 1911); Oklahoma City v. Derr, 109 Okla. 192, 235 Pac. 218 (1925).
15. Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U. S. 165 (1914). See also 6 WILAsToN,
CoNmAcrs (1938) § 1966.
16. Christie v. United States, 237 U. S. 234 (1915) ; Faber v. New York, 222 N. Y.
255, 118 N. E. 609 (1918);'Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co. v. New York, 259 App.
Div. 440, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 127 (4th Dep't 1940); McGovern v. New York, 202 App. Div.
317, 195 N. Y. Supp. 925 (1st Dep't 1922).
17. Severin v. United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 53 (1937).
18. See Berick, Warranties in Building Contracts (1932) 6 U. oF CiN. L. Rrv. 121.
19. Wheeling v. Casey Co., 74 F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
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tion ' 20 or statement of opinion,21 where detailed plans are not submitted
to bidders,22 where the contractor makes an independent examination of the
proposed work2 or is afforded adequate opportunity to do so,2-4 and where
the contractor is highly proficient in the particular type of work involved.*2
The degree of deviation entitling a contractor to additional compensation
has been described as "material,"2 ,,substantial,,,.27 "vital,12 8 and "radical."--
But whatever the terminology used, the test is intrinsically vague, and
cannot be defined or applied with mathematical precision. Litigated cases,
however, are suggestive of the extent of change essential to a recovery-
though at best they are clumsy criteria.30 In the instant case, the actual
excavation exceeded the estimate by 180 per cent, increasing the total work
by 24 per cent. Recovery has been granted in other cases where the increase
in the particular type of work has ranged from 5200 per cent dov to 155
per cent, and where the addition to the total work has extended from 210
per cent to 22 per cent.31 Recovery had been denied, however, in cases
where the increase in the particular type of work has ranged from 19 per
cent to 178 per cent, and where the enlargement of the total work has ex-
tended from 15 per cent to 64 per cent.
32
20. Application of Semper, 227 N. Y. 151, 124 N. E. 743 (1919).
21. Detroit & I. Ry. v. Guthrie & Co., 72 F. (2d) 126 (C. C.A. 6th, 1934).
22. See Berick, loc. cit. supra note 18.
23. Lentilhon v. New York, 102 App. Div. 548, 92 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't
1905).
24. Powell v. State, 118 S. W. (2d) 960 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Dallas v. Shortall,
114 S. IV. (2d) 536 (Comm. of App. of Te. 1938).
25. Jahn Contracting Co. v. Seattle, 100 Wash. 166, 170 Pac. 549 (191S).
26. Maney v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 77, 300 Pac. 642 (1931).
27. Faber v. New York, 222 N. Y. 255, 118 N. E. 609 (1918).
28. 6 WIusTSoN, Com-RAcrs (1938) § 1931.
29. Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. 457 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900).
30. The instant survey embraces only eighteen cases, owing to the fact that only
a small proportion of the opinions supply the figures needed to compile comparative
statistics. This is particularly true where recovery is denied.
31. Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. 457 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) (5200q, increase
in particular work); Hayden v. Astoria, 74 Ore. 525, 145 Pac. 1072 (1915) (780%
increase in particular work; 79% increase in total work); Sexton v. United States,
82 Ct. Cl. 550 (1936) (20% increase in particular work). The percentages in the fol-
lowing cases are increases in total work: Freund v. United States, 260 U. S. 60 (1922)
(21%); United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 253 U. S. 1 (1920) (147%); United
States v. Stage Co., 199 U. S. 414 (1905) (100%); Justice v. Booten, 270 Ky. 812,
110 S. W. (2d) 1094 (1937) (100%); Montrose Contracting Co. v. Westchester,
80 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (50%); Faber v. New York, 222 N. Y. 255,
118 N. E. 609 (1918) (22%).
32. Inland Constr. Co. v. Pendleton, 116 Ore. 663, 242 Pac. 842 (1926) (104%
increase in the particular work; 15% increase in total work); Jahn Contracting Co.
v. Seattle, 100 Wash. 166, 170 Pac. 549 (191S) (455% increase in total work); Palm-
berg v. Astoria, 112 Ore. 353, 228 Pac. 107 (1924) (64% increase in total work). The
percentages in the following cases are increases in the particular work: Molloy v.
Briarcliffe Manor, 145 App. Div. 483, 129 N. Y. Supp. 929 (2d Dep't 1911) (18%);
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If the work does deviate from the estimate to a marked degree, and the
contractor's reliance on the estimate is found reasonable, the contractor's
recovery for extra work may be framed on several legal theories. The first
of the available doctrinal devices is fraud. The right of a contractor to
rescind a contract induced by fraud, 3 or to recover for extra work occa-
sioned by bad faith in misstating material conditions affecting the work to
be done is well settled.3 4 This principle has been reinforced by the rule
that even a municipality may not contract out of liability for fraud or bad
faith.3 5 Occasionally courts have utilized the doctrine of misrepresentation
where the contractor's loss results from extreme negligence, carelessness, or
incompetence on the part of a municipal employee in preparing the esti-
mates.3" But the tort rationale is inappropriate in" the majority of cases,
where deviations between estimate and actuality result not from fraud or
negligent misrepresentation but from the inherent unpredictability of the
work to be done. In such cases, effective relief must be sought on other
theories.
Some courts have been willing to imply a warranty by the municipality
that the submitted representations are substantially accurate.3 7 Under this
doctrine, if conditions prove materially different from what they were repre-
sented to be, a recovery may be based upon breach of the implied warranty. a
Insofar as this theory embraces erroneous as well as fraudulent and negligent
representations, it is more useful than the misrepresentation rationale. Courts
confronted with contractual provisions expressly denying a warranty have
often deemed such clauses an insurmountable dialectic hurdle,30 and have
Hampton v. United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 162 (1935) (38%) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Bd.
of Water Comm'rs, 66 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (45%) ; Foundation Co. v. New
York, 233 N. Y. 177, 135 N. E. 236 (1922) (178%).
33. McCall v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. (2d) 527, 36 P. (2d) 642, 95 A. L. R. 1019,
1028 (1934); Lackovic v. Campbell, 225 Mich. 1, 195 N. W. 798 (1923). See also 5
NrILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1523.
34. Pearson v. Dublin [1907] A. C. 351. See also cases cited in ANSON, CONTRACTS
(Corbin's ed. 1930) § 198.
35. Bankers Trust Co. v. Hale & Kilburn Corp., 84 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936);
Pitt Constr. Co. v. Alliance, 12 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Downer v. Union
Land Co., 113 Minn. 410, 129 N. W. 777 (1911); Small v. Sullivan, 245 N. Y. 343,
157 N. E. 261 (1927).
36. Chicago v. Duffy, 218 Ill. 242, 75 N. E. 912 (1905) ; Chicago v. Sexton. 115 I1.
230, 2 N. E. 263 (1885) ; McCann v. Albany, 11 App. Div. 378, 42 N. Y. Supp. 94 (3d
Dep't 1896); Palmberg v. Astoria, 101 Ore. 224, 199 Pac. 630 (1921), 16 A. L. R. 1125,
1131; cf. Johnson Corp. v. New York, 162 Misc. 665, 295 N. Y. Supp. 545 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
37. United States v. Smith, 256 U. S. 11 (1921) ; Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs
v. Tierney, 1 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924) ; Kinnear v. Lincoln Park, 260 Mich. 250,
244 N. W. 463 (1932); State v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 43, 248 N. W.
807, 88 A. L.R. 790, 797 (1933).
38. United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 253 U. S. 1 (1920); United States
v. Spearin, 248 U. S. 132 (1918) ; Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U. S. 165 (1914);
Faber v. New York, 222 N. Y. 255, 118 N. E. 609 (1918).
39. Hampton v. United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 162 (1935) ; Sandy Hites Co. v. State Hwy.
Comm., 149 S. W. (2d) 828 (Mo. 1941); Lentilhon v. New York, 102 App. Div. 548,
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thus allowed municipalities to avoid responsibility for erroneous specifica-
tions. Some courts, however, have narrowed the application of these excul-
patory clauses, generally drafted by the municipal attorneys, by invoking the
rule that the terms of a contract are to be construed against its author. 0
Other tribunals have refused outright to give effect to these provisions on
the ground that a limit must be placed "on this method of leading a con-
tractor astray."
41
A less tortuous device, similar to that utilized in the instant case, involves
limiting the scope of the express contract to the quantity and nature of the
work contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was executed-
upon which there was a meeting of the minds.4 2 All work performed in
excess of this limitation and accepted by the municipality is deemed "new
and different" work,43 not governed by the express contract and for which
the contractor may recover on a quantum meruit."14 This remedy seems
especially appropriate in excavation cases- where an accurate estimate is
often difficult or even impossible- since it affords relief without the stigma
of damages.
The similar holding in the instant case, however, that unanticipated
circumstances "abrogated" the contract 45 is ambiguous. It is true that where
a contractor is faced with a qualitative increasc in the character of the work
-for example, where the parties contemplate earth excavation, but en-
counter rock 46 - it may be necessary to declare the contract "abrogated." 
4 T
Then recovery is based not on the original contract, but on a substituted
implied agreement to pay at a different unit price for the different hind of
work which was actually performed. On the other hand, where the increase
92 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1905) ; Palmberg v. Astoria, 101 Ore. 2_4, 199 Pac. 630
(1921), 16 A. L. R. 1125, 1131; Dallas v. Shortall, 114 S. W. t2d) 536 (Comm. of App.
of Tex. 1938).
40. Horgan v. Mayor, 160 N. Y. 516, 55 N. E. 204 (1899); Drainage Dist. No. 1
v. Rude, 21 F. (2d) 257, 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
41. Atlanta Constr. Co. v. State, 103 Misc. 233, 175 N. Y. Supp. 453 (CL of CA.
1918). This approach would seem reasonable in view of the fact that these provisions
are generally dictated by the municipality. For other cases adopting this position,
see United States v. Spearin, 248 U. S. 132 (1918); United States v. Stage Co., 199
U. S. 414 (1905); Maney v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 77, 300 Pac. 642 (1931),
76 A.L.R. 258, 268 (1932).
42. Montrose Contracting Co. v. Westchester, 80 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936);
Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. 457 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900); Cleveland, C. C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Moore, 170 Ind. 328, 82 N. E. 52 (1907).
43. Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. 457 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900). See also Freund
v. United States, 260 U. S. 60 (1922); Sobel Co. v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl. 149
(1938); Hayden v. Astoria, 74 Ore. 525, 145 Pac. 1072 (1915).
44. United States v. Stage Co., 199 U. S. 414 (1905); Horgan v. Mayor, 160
N. Y. 516, 55 N. E. 204 (1899) ; Board of Comm'rs v. O'Conner, 137 Ind. 6-2, 35 N. ..
1006 (1906); Inland Constr. Co. v. Pendleton, 116 Ore. 6tS, 242 Pac. 842 (1926); Com-
ments (1937) 31 ILi. L. REv. 780, (1936) 21 MixN. L. REv. 70.
45. Transbay Constr. Co. v. San Francisco, 35 F. Supp. 433, 436 (N. D. Cal. 1940).
46. See Maney v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 77, 300 Pac. 642 (1931).
47. Hayden v. Astoria, 74 Ore. 525, 145 Pac. 1072 (1915).
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in the stipulated work is strictly quantitative, as was apparently true in the
instant case, a quantum meruit recovery may be granted for the excess work
without disturbing the express contract. All that is necessary is to imply
an agreement to pay for an additional amount of work at the unit price
stipulated in the original contract.
48
In either case, however, the fact that the court should deem the contract
abrogated for purposes of quantum meruit recovery would not seem to
require the court to permit rescission.49 Although dicta in many cases sup-
port the contractor's privilege to rescind,50 other cases- likewise by way
of dictum-have indicated that while a substantial increase in expense
might justify additional compensation or a refusal to perform the extra work,
it would not relieve the contractor from his obligation to complete the stipu-
lated undertaking. 51 Where the contractor can be fully reimbursed by a
quantum meruit recovery, the latter rule would seem to be the sensible
solution. The construction of extensive municipal projects- such as dams,
reservoirs, sewer systems, highways, and bridges- would be needlessly
hampered by granting the contractor a privilege to rescind whenever actual
conditions belied previous calculation.
If the increasing possibilities of attack on exculpatory clauses discourage
their use, the result may be the adoption of fairer contractual devices for
allocating the risks of unforeseen contingencies. It might be provided that,
upon the city engineer's certification that any item in the contract exceeded
the specified estimate by more than a predetermined percentage, the municipal
commission should determine whether the contractor should proceed with
the additional work under the terms and at unit prices set forth in the
contract, or whether a special contract should be made for the excess.52
Such a stipulation, together with a scale of prices for extra work and
possibly coupled with a provision for arbitrating any dispute arising tinder
the contract, 53 would seem to afford an easy and equitable means of avoiding
litigation, and at the same time insure adequate protection for both the
municipality and the contractor.
48. See Inland Constr. Co. v. Pendleton, 116 Ore. 668, 242 Pac. 842 (1926).
49. Ibid. See also Cleveland, C. C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Moore, 170 Ind. 328,
82 N. E. 52 (1907).
50. See, for example, United States v. Spearin, 248 U. S. 132 (1918) and cases
therein cited. A better argument for rescission can be made in cases involving a
qualitative increase in work than in cases involving a quantitative increase, since, in
the former, the character of the work to be done may have changed to such a degree
that the contractor is no longer qualified or capable of doing the work required,
51. United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 253 U. S. 1 (1920).
52. For a case in which such a provision was involved, see Foundation Co. v.
New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 135 N. E. 236 (1922). It is significant that the court,
in this case, refused to interfere with the operation of the stipulated procedure. For
other cases where similar provisions were held a sufficient defense to a contractor's
suit for further compensation, see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs,
66 F. (2d) 730 (C. C.A. 2d, 1933); Molloy v. Briarcliffe Manor, 145 App. Div. 483,
129 N. Y. Supp. 929 (2d Dep't 1911).
53. See White, Arbitration Under Public Construction Contracts (1937) 1 ArimT
J. 149; Comment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 458, 461.
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DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES BECAUSE OF BIAS
AND PREJUDICE*
ALTHOUGH the concept of compulsory disqualification of judges was re-
jected by early common law,' the modern tendency has placed less reliance
upon their initiative in voluntarily withdrawing from a case. It was early
recognized that no man should be the judge of his own cause;2 and ever
since City of London v. lVood a a judge has not been allowed to sit on a
case in which he has a pecuniary interest. During the Nineteenth Century,
legislative enactments provided for judicial disqualification on the additional
grounds of consanguinity, affinity with a party, or previous involvement as
attorney in the case.4 While present judicial ethics would serve to make
recusation desirable because of bias per se, it has not been easy to overcome
the sanctity with which the judicial system and its officers are surrounded
and the practical difficulties of discovering when judicial bias exists or de-
ciding what degree of prejudice is essential to disqualification. In recent
years, however, many legislatures have made bias or prejudice per se cause
for disqualification, or have found it to be part of their constitutional3 or
common law.
7
Some states, unfortunately, still adhere to a modern version of the strict
"substantial interest" rule which prevailed at common law.8 In these juris-
dictions bias or prejudice are insufficient grounds for disqualification unless
* People ex reI. Rusch v. Cunningham, 303 Ill. App. 319, 31 N. E. (2d) 369 (1941).
1. Co. Li.* 294 (". . . judges or justices cannot be dallenged."); 3 BL. Coxns.
-361 ("By the laws of England also, in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might
be refused for good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that judges and
justices cannot be challenged. For the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor
in a judge, . . ."). The early American decisions followed Blackstone. See NValgrove
x% WValgrove, 3 Edw. Ch. 227, 228 (N. Y. 183) (filing of affidavit of prejudice held
"highly improper"; "It undertook to convey an insinuation that the complainant could not
have a fair trial before the Circuit Judge, %lhich was not to be listened to for one mo-
ment').
2: Anonymous, 1 Salk. 396 (1699).
3. 12 Mod. Rep. 669, 687 (1701).
4. Typical of such statutes: CoN N. GEN. STAT. (13n) § 5393; N. Y. Juwctmyv
LAW § 15.
The principle of judicial recusation comes mainly from the Civil Law. C. 3.1.16.
Most Civil Law countries make disqualification because of bias rather easy. Putnam,
Recusation (1909) 9 ComNi. L. Q. 1; German Code of Civil Procedure §§ 41, 42; French
Code of Civil Procedure, tit. 21, art. 378.
5. See AnizONA CODE AN-,. (1939) §§ 21-107; CAL CoD CIVIL Pro. (Deering,
1937) § 170.5; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 170, § 1; IND. ST.T. Am,. (Burns,
1933) § 9-1301 ; MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936) § 27.466; MONT. R~v. C,,PEus ANN.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 8868.
6. Hearn v. Miller, 163 Okla. 411, 33 P. (2d) 506 (1934).
7. People cx rel. Rusch v. Cunningham, 303 II. App. 319, 31 N. - (2d) 369 (1941).
S. Ex parte Pope, 26 Ala. App. 282, 158 So. 767 (1935); De Krasner v. Boykin, 54
Ga. App. 38, 186 S. E. 749 (1936); Ex porte Hague, 103 N. J. Eq. 505, 143 At. 836
(1928); Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 193 So. 452 (1940); Ferguson v. Chapman, 94
S. W. (2d) 593 (Te-. 1936) ; Tucker v. State, 35 Wyo. 430, 251 Pac. 460 (1926).
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the judge also possesses a pecuniary interest or "a personal right or privilege
in some way dependent upon the result of the case. . .. " Thus, although
the judge in Ex parte Pope'0 had been a candidate in the election in which
a fraud was supposed to have occurred and would gain or lose votes as a
result of his own decision, he wag not disqualified in a jurisdiction adhering
to this test because the number of votes in question was insufficient to change
the election results and his interest in the case was, therefore, "insubstantial."
Rationale of the "substantial interest" formula is that statutory and con-
stitutional provisions furnish the only grounds for disqualification; if bias
and prejudice are not specifically mentioned, they are, therefore, to be ex-
cluded." In support of this rule, it has been argued that "good" judges
do not allow their personal prejudices to impair their fairness.' 2 Further-
more, judges are usually conscious that their rulings and charges must, under
penalty of reversal, conform to certain legal norms. In following this rule,
however, courts have sometimes gone to the extreme of presuming that
judges are immune from any prejudices other than those specifically men-
tioned in the disqualification statutes. 13 Since change of judge or venue is
rarely possible in these jurisdictions, it may be that this test leads to economy
in the cost of administering justice. But by completely ignoring the problem
of judicial bias, the "substantial interest" doctrine becomes powerless to
prevent serious miscarriages of justice in many situations.
A somewhat more reasonable approach to the problem is illustrated by
the recent case of People ex rel. Rusch v. Cunningham.14 The defendants,
clerks and judges in a Chicago primary election, were charged with fraudu-
lently certifying an incorrect total of votes and permitting persons not regis-
tered to vote. The judge who tried the case had himself been a successful
candidate -in that election but had polled an unusually small vote in the
defendants' precinct. There was evidence that the judge had stated before
trial that the reported tally would have been impossible without misconduct
on the part of the defendants. In reversing the conviction of the defendants,
the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the judge was, as a vialer of
fact, "intensely interested" in the issues involved in the case and had not,
therefore, granted the impartial trial which Illinois common law guarantees
all litigants. 15
9. See Ex parte Hague, 103 N. J. Eq. 505, 510, 143 At. 836, 838 (1928).
10. 26 Ala. App. 282, 158 So. 767 (1935).
11. Hendricks v. State, 34 Ga. App. 508, 130 S. E. 539 (1925).
12. Cf. State v. Phillips, 159 La. 903, 106 So. 375 (1925).
13. Goldman Plumbing and Heating Corp. v. Nesbit, 244 App. Div. 311, 279 N. Y.
Supp. 738 (lst Dep't 1935) (court sustained trial judge who sentenced litigant for coln-
tempt of court for filing affidavit of prejudice against him; judge said to have been of
"unimpeachable character"). But see Van Schaick v. Carr, 159 Misc. 873, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 497 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
14. 308 II1. App. 319, 31 N. E. (2d) 369 (1941).
15. In the Cunningham case an Illinois court for the first time held that a judge is
disqualified at common law for prejudice. Previous cases involving judicial prejudice
were always decided on the basis of a statute permitting change of venue. ILL. An=.
STAT. (Smith-Hurd 1934) c. 146 § 21. When first arrested, the defendants in the pritt-
cipal case joined in a petition for a change of venue under the statute. The Illinois Ap-
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The ruling in the case follows a well established doctrine permitting dis-
qualification, even in the absence of substantial interest, where bias is found
actually to exist.1 6 The reasoning which underlies this formula, commonly
known as the "real prejudice" rule, is that while no person should be forced
to trial in the presence of actual bias, there is little likelihood of harm to a
litigant's interests unless the judge is in fact prejudiced, either against him
or in favor of the other party. The extreme difficulty of proving actual
prejudice, however, is illustrated by People v. Enzizett.'7 In that case, there
was an altercation between judge and counsel during the impaneling of a
jury, in the course of which the judge said: "Your standing before these
courts, Mr. - , is not such as to entitle you to any great consideration."
The appellate court, however, did not consider the statement as clearly
demonstrating the judge's bias.
In addition to the difficulty of proof, there are other possible defects in
the "real prejudice" test. In the first place, the rule will make necessary
appeals to review courts on the separate facts of each case, thus providing
opportunities for unnecessary delay. Secondly, any objective test, such as
this, will not always succeed in convincing the parties to the action of the
fairness of the trial, and thus public confidence in the courts may be im-
paired.'
8
In an effort to meet these criticisms and eliminate all possibility of trial
before a prejudiced tribunal, a few legislatures have adopted the extreme
remedy of automatic disqualification. 0  Whenever a litigant feels that the
judge assigned to his suit will not give him a fair trial, he is empowered
to effect a change in judges merely by filing an affidavit of prejudice. Here
the litigant's, rather than the judge's, attitude controls disqualification, and
"proof of facts showing bias and prejudice is not required or permitted."2-
Although the federal statute 2' was also intended to make disqualification
immediate upon the filing of an affidavit of prejudice,-- the courts in applying
the statute have deprived it of some of its automatic quality. While the judge
is forced to accept as true the facts set out in the affidavit, the statute has
pellate Court held the statute not applicable to statutory contempts growing out of elec-
tion frauds. People ex rel. Rusch v. Williams, 292 Ill. App. 2"8, 11 N. E. (2d) 37 (1937).
16. Accord, Chastain v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. App. (2d) 97, 57 P. (2d) 932 (1936) ;
Strand Amusement Co. v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 48, 43 S. W. (2d) 321 (1931) ; King
v. Grace, 293 Mass. 244, 200 N. E. 346 (1936). This was the former English rule and it
prevailed in several of the English Dominions as well. The Queen v. Rand, [1866] L. R.
1 Q. B. 230; The King v. Justices of Co. Tyrone, [1909] 2 I. R. 763, 43 I. L. T. 262 (Ir.
Y. B.) ; Reg. v. Klemp, 10 0. R. 143 (Ont. Q. B. 1M86).
17. 123 Cal. App. 678, 12 P. (2d) 92 (1932).
18. "Faith that justice is being done is secondary only to the actual dispensation of
justice." Van Schaick v. Carr, 159 Misc. 873, 289 N. Y. Supp. 495 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
19. Ixn. Sr.i. ANN. (Bums, 1933) § 9-1301, Shaw v. State, 126 Ind. 39, 146 N. E.
855 (1925); MoNT. Ray. CoDFs ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §86S, State
ex rel. Grogan v. District Ct., 44 Mont. 72, 119 Pac. 174 (1911).
20. State ex rel Grogan v. District Ct., 44 Mfont. 72, 119 Pac. 174 (1911).
21. 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §25 (1934). It was patterned after the In-
diana law, supra note 19.
22. 46 CONG. Rac. 2626 (1911).
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been interpreted as permitting the judge to decide whether those facts will
support a conclusion of bias.23 Under this construction, judges have not been
compelled to withdraw where allegations were obviously frivolous or made
for the purpose of delay. 24 The statutory requirement of "personal preju-
dice" 25 of the judge against the particular suitor and the prohibition against
more than one change of judge provide further safeguards against perversion
of the statute.
Since the "automatic disqualification" rule appears to place unnecessarily
broad power in the hands of litigants, a more moderate policy has met with
increasing favor.26 Under this view the court considers whether the circum-
stances surrounding the trial would create in the mind of the litigant a
"reasonable apprehension" that he would not receive a fair trial.2 7 The great
advantage of this subjective test is that it enhances public confidence in the
impartiality of the courts: "it is of fundamental importance that justice
should, not only be done, but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be
done." 
28
A possible disadvantage of the "reasonable apprehension" rule is that,
unlike automatic disqualification, it requires constant appellate rulings oil
new sets of facts as they arise. In applying this, as well as the "real preju-
dice" formula, the appellate court is faced with these normative questions:
What facts should be taken to prove bias, and what circumstances ought to
be held to justify a litigant's suspicions?
Where investigation of the facts creating bias is necessary, the judge's
conduct and associations usually become the focal point of consideration.
Since the judge's statements are the clearest indication of his attitude, most
courts have held that judicial condemnation of a litigant before trial is
23. Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22 (1921). The judge accused of bias, or any
other federal judge, may determine the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged. United
States v. Pendergast, 34 F. Supp. 269 (W. D. Mo. 1940).
24. United States v. Flegenheimer, 14 F. Supp. 584 (D. N. J. 1935). (Dixie Davis,
counsel for Dutch Schultz, alleged that Judge William Clark was "biased and prejudiced
in favor of the United States of America.").
25. Parker v. Northeastern Oil Corp., 13 F. (2d) 497 (D. Mass. 1926).
26. This doctrine prevails in the following jurisdictions: Jensen v. Jensen, 96 Colo.
151, 40 P. (2d) 238 (1935); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932) ;
Davidson v. Shilling, 187 Okla. 319, 103 P. (2d) 84 (1940) ; Leonard v. Willcox, 101
Vt. 195 (1928), 142 At. 762. The rule has also found widespread support in England ani
the British Dominions. Cottle v. Cottle, [1939] 2 All E. R. 535 (Prob. Div.) ; Tile Queen
ex rel. Mauger v. Molesworth, 23 V. L. R. 582 (Victoria, 1898) ; Nicols v. Graham,
[19371 3 D. L. R. 795 (K. B. Man.).
27. "The court considers not merely whether there has been any real bias in the mind
of the presiding judge against the applicant, but whether incidents may not have happened,
which though they may be susceptible of explanation, are nevertheless such as are calcu-
lated to create in the mind of the applicant a justifiable apprehension that he would not
have an impartial trial." Amar Singh v. Sadhu Singh, (1925) I. L. R. 6 Lah. 396 (High
Ct. of Lahore, India).
28. Lord Hewart, C. J., in Rex v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 K. B. 256, 259, 93 L. J.
K. B. 129, 131.
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begun 29 or during its course 3° disqualifies the judge from trying the case.
Where there has been expressed judicial antipathy for groups or classes
of which one of the parties is a member, most courts have concluded that
such statements are no indication of personal prejudice against the individual
party.
31
Aside from express statements, charges of judicial bias have been most
frequently based on friendship or acquaintance, 32 common political affiliation, 3
common church or club membership.34 Captious charges of bias based on
such claims or other minor incidents in the judge's past or present life have
been a source of great difficulty to the courts.&3
29. State ex rel La Russa v. Himes, 144 Fla. 145, 197 So. 762 (1940) ("I will put
people like La Russa away.") ; Clarke v. Commonwealth, 259 Ky. 572, 82 S. I. (2d) 823
(1935) ("I will disbar aff.ant if that's the last thing I do.") ; Castleherry v. Jones, 63
Okla. Cr. 414, 99 P. (2d) 174 (1940) ("He is a bootlegger, and his illicit business will
be stopped."). Not disqualified: Moore v. Dugas, 166 Ga. 493, 143 S. E. 591 (1923)
(judge, editor of local paper, had criticized litigant in its editorials).
30. McFadden v. United States, 63 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) ("1 think I
have one of your men convicted right here.") ; Pittman v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. 223,
286 Pac. 425 (1922) ("There is a partnership; such will be the final holding of this court,
and it is useless for defendant to offer any evidence to the contrary.") ; Leonard v. Will-
cox, 101 Vt 195, 142 Atl. 762 (1928) ("It will be utterly useless for me to attempt to get
out of my mind conclusions reached on this matter at hearing last term."). Not disquali-
fled: State v. Cole, 136 Kan. 381, 15 P. (2d) 452 (1932) ("He had more than fair trials
the other two times, and it is up to this county to demonstrate whether they can do their
duty or not.").
31. Strand Amusement Co. v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 4, 43 S. W (2d) 321 (1931)
(judge told ministerial association that operators of Sunday movies should be arrested
and rearrested); Regina v. Klemp, 10 0. R. 143 (Ont. Q. B. IS6) (judge said he would
never fine a violator of the temperance law less than $50.). Contra: The King v. Rand,
15 D. L. R. 69, 13 E. L. R. 450 (Nov. Scot. Sup. Ct. 1913) (judge said he would convict
any parties charged with selling liquor whether evidence proved it or not).
32. Disqualified: Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 461 (1932) (judge's
former law partner and close friend chief witness for other side) ; Brook.-lyn Bar Ass'n v.
King's County Bar Ass'n, 258 App. Div. 920, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 751 (2d Dep't 1939)
(court were all members of plaintiff bar ass'n); State cx reL Bennett v. Childers, 183
Okla. 14, 105 P. (2d) 762 (1940) (judge's son attorney for plaintiff). Xot disqualificd:
Goldman Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Nesbit, 244 App. Div. 311, 279 N. Y. Supp. 73S
(1st Dep't 1935) (plaintiff "stood well" with ex-Sheriff who could influence judge) ; Gar-
rett v. State, 187 ' Miss. 441, 193 So. 452 (1940) (judge and chief witness for prosecu-
tion good friends).
33. Not disqualified: Ex parte Pope, 28 Ala. App. 282, 153 So. 767 (1935) ; Lan-
drum v. Cockrell, 230 Ky. 599, 20 S. W. (2d) 464 (1929) (judge and election contestee
political allies); Ex parte Hague, 103 N. J. Eq. 505, 143 At. 836 (1923) (close political
connections).
34. The King v. Justices of County Tyrone, [1909] 2 1. R. 763, 43 I. L. T. 262 (Ire-
land, K. B.) (justices, members of church vestry instituting complaint, disqualified).
35. Disqualified: State cx rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613 (1939)
(attorney for defendant had had judge disqualified on three previous occasions). Not dis-
qualified: Benedict v. Seiberling, 17 F. (2d) 831 (N. D. Ohio 1926) (judge had busi-
ness dealings with those instigating opposing side to litigate.) ; People v. Sweet, 19 Cal.
App. (2d) 392, 65 P. (2d) 899 (1937) (Judge, former deputy district attorney, had high
regard for district attorney's office).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
It is fairly well settled that a judge's decisions or actions in previous,
similar cases will not support an allegation of bias.80 Nor has any court
seriously considered charges that the trial judge is biased in favor of the
strict enforcement of the laws.37 But if the judge has taken an active part
in bringing about a criminal prosecution, the courts are agreed that the
accused has good reason to mistrust the judge's impartiality. 8
After judgment, charges of bias based on the judge's conduct during the
course of the trial have been urged as grounds both for reversal 9 and for
obtaining another judge in case a new trial is granted. 40 Losing parties
have pointed with varying degrees of success to the judge's action in packing
the jury,41 his rulings in the case, 42 unnecessary rudeness and impatience
with the attorney,43 frequent interruptions, and his one-sided questioning of
witnesses.44 In criminal cases, defendants have stressed the judge's favor-
able comment on the jury's verdict of guilty 45 as well as his remarks in
passing sentence 46 as illustrative of his bias throughout the trial, but such
claims have seldom been upheld; most courts emphasize that judges have
not only the privilege but the duty of forming conclusions from the evi-
dence.47 This latter guiding principle holds a fortiori for non-jury cases in
which losing litigants have attempted to disqualify the trial judge from hear-
ing the motion for a new trial.
48
36. United States v. Murphy, 19 F. Supp. 987 (W. D. Mo. 1937) (opinions of judge
that he was not disqualified in similar, former cases); Craven v. United States, 22 F.
(2d) 605 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927) (severe penalties and fines imposed on liquor violators in
the past).
37. United States v. Flegenheimer, 14 F. Supp. 584 (D. N. J. 1935).
38. State v. Bolitho, 103 N. J. L. 246, 136 Atl. 164 (1927) (irregular procedure by
which trial judge invoked investigation of county prosecutor's conduct) ; Nicols v. Gra-
ham, [1937] 3 D. L. R. 795 (Man. K. B.) (police magistrate ex-officlo a member of
Police Board which formulated policy for prosecuting offenders of Lord's Day Act).
39. King v. Grace, 293 Mass. 244, 200 N. E. 346 (1936).
40. Craven v. United States, 22 F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927).
41. Compare Fisk v. Venable, 61 Okla. Cr. 360, 68 P. (2d) 425 (1937) (disqualified;
all but two or three of jury being members of judge's Sunday School class), with Ryan
v. United States, 99 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (not disqualified; judge excluded
residents of county where conspiracy took place from sitting in the jury).
42. Such rulings alone are hardly ever sufficient basis for disqualification. Walker
v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
43. City of Palatka v. Frederick, 128 Fla. 366, 174 So. 826 (1937) ; Sandlin v. Wes-
ton, 162 Okla. 107, 19 P. (2d) 361 (1933)..
44. Bradburn Motors Co. v. Moverman, 7 A. (2d) 207 (R. I. 1939) ; Twin City Fire
Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 145 Okla. 293, 292 P. 833 (1930).
45. Johnson v. State, 46 Ga. App. 494, 167 S. E. 900 (1933) (judge called verdict
just and proper). A Georgia statute disqualifies a judge from presiding at a retrial II
case he expresses approval or disapproval in open court of the jury's verdict. GA. CoDE
ANN. (Park, et al., 1936) tit. 110, § 202.
46. People v. Mexicott, 288 Mich. 671, 286 N. W. 121 (1939) (strong desire to con-
vict such offenders).
47. See Craven v. United States, 22 F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927).
48. People v. Hooper, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 704, 61 P. (2d) 370 (1936) ; In re Malvasi's
Estate, 96 Cal. App. 204, 273 Pac. 1097 (1929).
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Our judicial system has now achieved a sophistication which should permit
realistic approach to the question of disqualification of judges. Extreme
solutions of change at the will of the suitor, or only in the presence of a
narrowly defined substantial interest, have only a possible administrative
simplicity to offer to counteract their inadequacy in providing a fair result
in the particular case. Of the two mediate solutions which have been pro-
posed, the "reasonable apprehension" doctrine appears superior. Its subjec-
tivity rightly recognizes that honest belief in the presence of bias can be
almost as serious a handicap to judicial efficiency, if not justice itself, as
factual prejudice. Any well functioning system of disqualification should, of
course, require immediate challenge to the eligibility of the judge as soon
as the facts leading to apprehension of bias become known; strict insistence
upon waiver in the absence of such protest is necessary to prevent last
minute "discovery" of bias by losing parties "combing" the record for
grounds for reversal upon appeal. It is to be hoped, however, that an ever
increasing number of jurisdictions will adopt this flexible standard for
judging the unceasing claims of litigants that they have been denied justice.
DISCHARGE OF TAXES BY ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATES
TO A TAXING BODY*
A PRACTICAL reason for the high percentage of uncollected taxes in coun-
ties and municipalities 1 may be found in the expense of proceedings to con-
vert the property interests acquired at a tax sale into a marketable title. The
ordinary tax deed obtained at the termination of the redemption period results
in a title subject to defeat by proof of any defect in the proceedings on which
it is based.2 Hence, to create a marketable title, proceedings similar to the
* In re Ueck's Estate, 286 N. Y. 1, 35 X. E. (2d) 624 (1941), rcv'g, 260 App. Di.
369, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 740 (4th Dep't 1940).
1. Tax delinquency is not limited to small municipalities or counties. See Chatters,
The Enforcement of Real Estate Tax Liens, Municipal Administration Service, No. 10
(New York, 1928)- Bird, Extent and Distribution of Urban Tax Delilqucney (1936)
3 LAW AND CONrEIP. PaoB. 337; Smith, Recent Legislative Indulgences to Dclinqucnt
Tax Payers (1936) 3 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 370. In 1935 the New York legislature
authorized the creation of county, town, or village tax arrears boards, to examine
property under liens acquired prior to Jan. 1, 1935, and, if the total taxes, assessments and
water rates exceeded assessed valuation, to determine the amount to be paid. N. Y. TAx
LAW, c. 61, art. 4, § 96-b.
2. Hennepin Improvement Co. v. Schuster, 124 N. Y. Supp. 93, 66 Misc. 634 (Sup.
Ct. 1910), affd, 151 App. Div. 903, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1134 (4th Dep't 1912); In the Mat-
ter of Acquiring Title to Ritter Place, 139 App. Div. 473, 124 X. Y. Supp. 351 (1st Dep't
1910); Ford v. Agor, 204 1\. Y. Supp. 219, 123 Misc. 214 (Sup. Ct. 192-). Allen, For-
feiture of Real Properly Rights Throqh Tax Delinquency (1933) 14 J. o0 LAy.' A;ND P.
U. EcoN. 382; Chatters, loc. cit. supra note 1. Many states have attacked te problem by
providing that the tax title may not be attacked for procedural irregularities after the
lapse of a given time. See Wood v. Lovett, 313 U. S. 362 (1941).
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foreclosure of a mortgage are necessary. Statistics indicate, however, that
unless the taxes on a given parcel exceed $500, the foreclosure suit, although
successful, will be unprofitable.3 To meet this condition a short and inexpen-
sive in ren tax lien foreclosure proceeding has been advocated 4 and such a
statute has recently been adopted in New York StateY Its operation, however,
is conditional upon the statute being adopted by the taxing district, and, per-
haps because of the political repercussions which might follow a vigorous
enforcement program, few municipalities have as yet taken advantage of the
procedure. 6
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently handed down a decision 7
which will encourage the employment of this new remedy. Annual delin-
quencies and subsequent sales had taken place on certain properties in the City
of Buffalo and County of Erie. In cases where other purchasers were want-
ing, the city and county .were forced to bid in the property, taking certificates
of sale. Under the applicable laws, the holders of tax sale certificates were
privileged to terminate the owner's right of redemption at the expiration of
two years,8 and foreclose the tax lien,9 but this procedure was not followed.
Instead, the taxing bodies merely retained their certificates of sale. After ten
years of successive delinquencies, tax sales, and issuance of certificates of
3. The average cost of 22,576 completed mortgage foreclosures in the Borough of
Queens in New York City was $546.54. Fairchild, Economic Aspects of Land Titles
(1936) 22 CORN. L. Q. 229, 331.
4. The remedy has the salient features of all actions in rem, The court is given
jurisdiction on the filing by the collecting officer of the tax district in the office of the
clerk of the county in which the property is situated, of a verified list of all parcels of
property affected by unpaid tax liens held and owned by the tax district. The only ser-
vice of process required is publication of notice of the list. Any party having an
interest in any lands listed may redeem from the lien or file an answer. The procedure
renders unnecessary a costly search for interested parties, eliminates the necessity of a
public sale of the property in the foreclosure proceeding, and permits the consolidation of
actions against different parcels of land. For a brief examination of the sale and fore-
closure provisions of the so-called Model Tax Law, see Brandis, Tax Sales and Fore-
closures under the Model Tax Collection Law (1936) 3 LAW AND CONTEMI. PROl. 406.
5. The statute was enacted by the New York Legislature in 1939. N. Y. TAX LAW
c. 61, art. 7-A, Tit. 3. It provides that the tax district may summarily foreclose any tax
liens which remain unpaid for a period of four years after becoming due, and has recently
been held constitutional. The City of Utica v. Carmela Proite, Sup. Ct., Oneida Cy.,
Oct. 3, 1941.
6. By June, 1940, the in rein procedure had been adopted in nine municipalities and
four counties. (Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from the Conference of May-
ors and Other Municipal Officials, Albany, N. Y., Oct. 25, 1941). For a discussion of
the traditional methods for the collection of delinquent taxes, see Chatters, loc. cit. supra
note 1; Allen, Collection of Delinquent Taxes by Recourse to the Taxed Property (1936)
3 LAW AND CONTE!P. PROB. 397. In all of these procedures, the reliability of tax titles
is questio' able. On improved methods of collection, see Allen, loe. eit. supra note 2,
7. In re Ueck's Estate, 286 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. (2d) 624 (1941), rezg, 260 App.
Div. 369, 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 740 (4th Dep't 1940).
8. N. Y. Laws 1884, c. 135, § 20; as amended by N. Y. Laws 1909, e. 383, § 20;
CHARTER OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, Local Law No. 4 (1927) §§618, 619, 621. (Pub-
lished in Local Laws of Cities in State of New York for 1932).
9. N. Y. Laws 1884, c. 135, §§ 27, 28 as amended by N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 383, § 28;
THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO §§ 623, 640, 653.
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sale against the same parcels of property, the owner died. The city and county
then sought priority of payment out of the estate of the deceased under Sec-
tion 212 of the Surrogate's Court Act, which gives priority of payment to
"taxes assessed on property of the deceased previous to his death." "I The
Surrogate's Court and Appellate Division granted priority, ruling that where
the city and county had been forced to bid in the property and take certificates
of sale, there had as yet been no payment of the taxes."1 The Court of
Appeals reversed. Its opinion was based upon a literal interpretation of the
taxing statutes to the effect that a "sale" having taken place, and the taxing
body having "purchased" the property for the amount of the taxes, the taxes
were "paid" and discharged.
On the equities the decision is persuasive. For periods ranging up to eight
years, the taxing units failed to exercise their rights against the land. If,
upon the owner's death, they were permitted to take what personal assets
he had, there would be nothing left for the general creditors, since the deced-
ent's property was heavily encumbered by mortgages. But beyund the actual
case, the importance of the decision is its lesson that, if the governmental
unit expects to get its revenue, it must proceed with dispatch to obtain a
marketable title. This necessity should encourage the early foreclosure of
tax certificates -most efciently accomplished by the new in rem procedure.
In reaching its conclusion that the taxes were discharged by the tax sale,
however, the court raised certain problems of construction and analysis. It
is clear that in the case of a sale of tax delinquent lands to an individual, the
city receives the amount of the taxes in direct payment from the purchaser
on behalf of the delinquent taxpayer; the taxes are discharged as far as the
city is concerned and the purchaser is given an interest in the land in con-
sideration of his payment. But when the city or county itself "purchases"
the land, no additional money is received in the treasury. Moreover, as in
the case of the purchase by an individual, the taxpayer still has the right of
possession,'- the right to take the rents and profits of the land,13 and is liable
for taxes assessed during the period of redemption,14 while the purchaser is
10. NEw Yoa SURROGAT.'S CouRT AcT § 212.
11. Record on Appeal, pp. 35-40. The surrogate made a distinction between the
taxing body as the holder of a tax certificate, and individual or corporate holders. The
ruling was that in the case of individuals or corporations holding certificates, the taxing
body had received payment of the taxes on behalf of the delinquent taxpayer, and the
taxes were hence discharged. In the case of the taxing body bidding in the land, and
taking a certificate, the surrogate held that there had as yet been no payment, and per-
mitted the taxing bodies to claim against the personal assets of the decedent. From the
portion of the decree denying individual or corporate holders of tax certificates any
claim to the personal assets of decedent, there was no appeal.
12. N. Y. Laws 1884, c. 135, § 31, as amended by N.Y. Laws 1909, c. 383, § 31; T n
CHRsTEM oF THE Cray oF BuFFAo § 617; Millard v. Breckwoldt, 100 App. Div. 44,
90 N.Y. Supp. 890 (4th Dep't 1904) ; BLAcK, TAx Tirms (1st ed. 18,3) § 169; 3 Coo=,
T.ATIooN (4th ed. 1924) § 1458.
13. Millard v. Breckwoldt, 100 App. Div. 44, 90 N. Y. Supp. 890 (4th Dep't 1904);
3 Cooixya, T~xAIox- (4th ed. 1924) § 1461; BLAcK, TAX Trrss (1st ed. 1823) § 171.
14. Armstrong v. County of Nassau, 101 App. Div. 116, 91 N. Y. Supp. 867 (2d
Dep't 1905); City of Rochester v. Rochester Ry., 109 App. Div. 638, 96 N. Y. Supp.
152 (4th Dep't 1905); Wells v. Johnson, 171 N. Y. 324, 63 N. E. 1095 (1902).
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liable in an action for waste if he ventures to use the land.", In point of fact,
the sale to the city or county has only two legal consequences. First, it initi-
ates the two year period of redemption at the termination of which the tax-
ing body may take a deed to the land. Secondly, it establishes a point of
rest from which penalty interest at twelve per cent begins to run upon the suni
of the tax and -accrued interest.
The practical problem is whether these additional privileges and powers
are a sufficient increment in the taxing district's property rights to constitute
a discharge of the taxes. Instead of analyzing the problem in these ternis,
the court intimates that the taxes are "paid" because the tax sale operates as
a present grant or transfer of title from the delinquent taxpayer to the munici-
pality. This is a proposition difficult to reconcile with either the statutes or
decisions of the state.' 6 If the claim for taxes is extinguished by the sale, it
is not because of any change in "title" or the benefits incident to possession,
but solely because of the increment in property rights previously indicated. If
the opinion is taken literally to mean, as the dissenters intimate it must, that
the sale is a "grant or transfer of title," it will lead to much disputation over
tax titles, the rights of ownership, assessment of subsequent taxes, and kin-
dred problems.
An alternative rationale grounded on an "election of remedies" argument
might have circumvented the question of whether there had been a discharge
of the taxes, and avoided the ambiguities of the present opinion. Broadly
speaking, two methods for the collection of general property taxes levied upon
real property held by a resident should be available to the taxing body; either
an action against the delinquent taxpayer,17 or sale of the taxpayer's prop-
erty.'8 Personal liability attaches only where the owner is a resident of the
taxing district and his name is correctly entered on the assessment roll. 10
15. See note 13 supra; 3 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1460; BLACx, TAX
TiTLEs (1st ed. 1888) § 170. The owner is likewise liable in an action for waste if he
despoils the land during the period of redemption. N. Y. TAX LAw c. 61, art. 6, § 129.
16. The general policy of the state in this respect is clear. N. Y. TAX LAW c. 61,
art. 6, § 131, provides for a conveyance only after the lapse of a year from the date of
sale. Sections 152, 154 establish a similar restriction on sales by the county. See also
THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO §§ 623-653 regulating conveyances of property
by the city after a tax sale. Wells v. Johnson, 171 N. Y. 324, 63 N. E. 1095 (1902)
(title is complete in state only upon expiration of period of redemption) ; People e.r rel.
Oakley v. Bleckuvenn, 126 N. Y.-310, 27 N. E. 376 (1891); People e. rel. Morgenthau
v. Cady, 105 N. Y. 299, 11 N. E. 810 (1887) (sale is only the starting point in the pro-
cess of collection). This is the view taken by the minority in the instant case. Accord:
Lee v. Farone, 261 App. Div. 674, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 585 (3d Dep't 1941); Racquette
Falls & Co. v. International Paper Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 836, 41 Misc. 357 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
17. Personal liability of the taxpayer is provided in N. Y. TAX LAW c. 61, art, 4,
§§ 71, 82, 299. Section 71 upon which the liability is grounded has state wide applica-
tion. Village of Lynbrook v. Otto, 266 N. Y. 308, 194 N. E. 766 (1935). See also Buy-
FALO CITY CHARTER § 326, and N. Y. Laws 1884, c. 135, § 33.
18. N. Y. TAX LAW c. 61, art. 6, §§ 119-144; N. Y. TAX LAW c. 61, art. 7, §§ 150-
160; BUFFALO CITY CHARTER §§ 610-627; N. Y. Laws 1884, c. 135, § 13 as amended by
N. Y. Lavs 1909, c. 383, § 13.
19. N. Y. TAX LAW c. 61, § 71; Village of Lynbrook v. Otto, 266 N. Y. 308, 194 N.
E. 766 (1935) ; Village of Massapequa Park v. Massapequa Park Valley Sites, Inc., 273
N. Y. 28, 15 N. E. (2d) 177 (1938).
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Although these qualifications have so inhibited this remedy that it has fallen
into--irtual disuse, the present case suggests that under proper circumstances
it may be revived. In that event, even though the statute does not expressly
require an election, it would seem that one might be imposed. Where, as
in the instant case, the municipality has initiated prescribed proceedings for
collection by sale of the land, resulting in additional interest, costs and pen-
alties, it should be forced to proceed to a conclusion against the property if
it is to realize on the taxes. The significance of the election principle lies in
the fact that the Surrogate's Court Act gives priority only to taxes which
were personal liabilities of the deceased taxpayer. -  If in electing to pro-
ceed against the property, the taxing body has abandoned its right of personal
action, its claim against the personal estate of deceased fails.
Another setting for the problem in the instant case may occur in the bank-
ruptcy of the delinquent taxpayer. Under Section 67(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act 21 liens for taxes and debts owing the sovereign are enforceable against
the property to which they have attached or the proceeds of the sale thereof,
before payment of debts entitled to priority under Section 641a).- While
20. The SumoGATE's COURT AcT (§ 212) directs the executor to pay "debts of the
deceased" according to the following order: ". . . (2) Taxes assessed on property of
the deceased previous to his death." It then defines "debts" as ".... every claim and
demand upon which a judgment for a sum of money or directing the payment of money,
could be recovered in an action" (§ 314).
In numerous cases this has been interpreted to mean that the only allowable claims
for taxes falling within the Surrogate's Act are those which are personal liabilities of
the deceased. Matter of Hun, 144 N. Y. 472, 39 N. E. 376 (1895) ; (street assessments
held liens against land not payable from personal assets of deceased). Lauby v. Gill,
42 Misc. 334, 86 N. Y. Supp. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (taxes "were lien enforceable against
land only") ; In re Hewitt, 81 N. Y. Supp. 1030, 40 Mise. 322 (Surr. Ct. 1903) (taxes
disallowed as personal claims under § 212; they were liens against particular property,
and the procedure for their collection wmas in rein); Krueger v. Schlinger, 19 Misc. 221,
43 N. Y. Supp. 305 (Sup. Ct. 1897) (taxes held to be charge against land, not "debts"
of the testator). See In re Eckenroth's Will. 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 5,3, 167 Misc. 632
(Surr. Ct. 1938) passim; see also Wise v. Wedlake, 217 App. Div. 210, 216 N. Y. Supp.
699 (4th Dep't 1926) ; ef. Matter of Babcock, 115 N. Y. 450, 22 N. E. 263 (1889) (taxes
not merely charges against land must be paid out of decedent's estate); cf. Matter of
Gill, 199 N. Y. 155, 92 N. E. 390 (1910).
None of these cases involve a claim by the holder of a tax certificate w here the sale
took place long before the taxpayer's death, as in the instant case. The holder of a tax
certificate has only a claim in rein against the land. In tax certificate foreclosure pru-
ceedings the laws applicable to mortgage foreclosure are to be adopted. BurFrLo Csiv
CHARTER § 642. The analogy to § 250 of the N. Y. RFAL ProP. L.w seems convincing.
This section abrogated the common law rule that the devisee of real property was entitled
to have any encumbrances thereon satisfied out of decedent's assets, and specifically pro-
vides that the devisee must satisfy any mortgages upon his property without recourse
to the executor. Matter of Soper, 224 App. Div. 431, 231 N. Y. Supp. 333 (4th Dep't
1928). Since the tax certificate held by the city in the instant case is the functional
equivalent of a mortgage against the property, the provisions of the Real Property Law
relating to mortgages would seem apposite.
21. BANxKuPTcY AcT, 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 1-1103 (Supp. 1939).
22. This is subject to the exception stated in § 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act which
provides that statutory liens on personal property of the bankrupt unaccompanied by
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tax certificates are not in themselves mentioned in the Bankruptcy Act nor
are there any cases involving priority of holders of tax sale certificates as
against general creditors, it would seem that since the certificate is function-
ally the equivalent of a lien, the provisions relating to liens would be applica-
ble. Section 67(b), however, applies only to secured creditors,2 8 and, if the
security is not adequate to meet the lien, the lien-holder would be relegated to
his fourth priority under Section 64(a) as an unsecured creditor for the resi-
due of the "taxes." 24
The result in the instant case, discharging tax liability to the city in ex-
change for a title unmarketable without a costly foreclosure, is a forceful
reminder to all governmental units that only by promptly creating marketable
tax titles can the taxing body assure itself of the legitimate contributions of
its taxpayers. While the case on its facts is limited to the City of Buffalo
and the County of Erie, the laws of that area are sufficiently representative
of local laws in New York State to permit a wider application of the prin-
ciples of the decision.2 5 The adverse effect of tax delinquency upon public
credit, the chaos it creates in budget calculations, and the unfair load it forces
onto the shoulders of conscientious taxpayers have made it a problem com-
mon to every community. This decision, in pointing up the need for expedi-
tious tax collection procedures, should stimulate more widespread adoption of
the simplified in rem foreclosure proceedings.
possession, and not enforced by sale before bankruptcy, are to be postponed in payment
to the debts enumerated in clauses (1) and (2) of § 64(a). Section 67(c) does not, how-
ever, alter the status of liens against real property. Matter of Pa. Brewing Co., 114 F.
(2d) 1010 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 685 (1940).
23. Unsecured claims for 1tAxes are given fourth priority under § 64(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. It is settled that this provision relates solely to unsecured claims, and that
claims secured by liens are to be paid first under § 67(b). Matter of Cardwell, 52 F. (2d)
158 (S. D. Tex. 1931). Section 57(j) excludes any claim for penalties, but if a penalty
for taxes is secured by a valid lien at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
it will be allowed. Hiscock v. Varick Bank of New York, 206 U. S. 28 (1907) ; In re
Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., Inc., 100 F. (2d) 979 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
24. If the taxing unit does not have a lien, it can claim only a right of priority under
§64(a) (4). City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174 (1919) ; In re Tresslar, 20 F. (2d)
663 (N. D. Ala. 1927). A tax claim not perfected as a lien may still be paid under
§ 64(a) (4). In re S. Alex Smith and Co., 289 Fed. 524 (S. D. Fla. 1923).
25. In all tax cases, the rights of the parties are defined by applicable statutes. See
MacFarlane v. City of Brooklyn, 122 N. Y. 585, 26 N. E. 19 (1890).
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